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ABSTRACT 
A DECISION-MAKING CONSTRUCT FOR COMPLEX SITUATIONS 
Van Brewer 
Old Dominion University, 2010 
Committee Director: Dr. Andres Sousa-Poza 
The uncertainty inherently associated with complexity challenges decision-making 
processes, indicating a need for a construct for decision making in complex situations. A 
review of the literature on systems, complexity, and paradigms indicates that such a 
construct must be internally consistent with well-defined philosophical foundations and 
further that systems and complexity (as used in complex situations) are not necessarily 
internally consistent with traditional philosophical foundations. Therefore, a decision 
making construct for complex situations requires research into different foundations. This 
research addresses these gaps, deriving axiological and methodological components based 
on a set of principles consistent with the ontology and epistemology of Sousa-Poza and 
Correa-Martinez (2005). The combination of these four philosophical components is 
asserted to establish a Complex Situations Paradigm providing a foundational perspective 
for complexity and systems. 
The characteristics of this research require particular attention to the appropriate 
research methodology. Canons for research are typically based on philosophical 
foundations of rationalism or empiricism; hence this research derives a set of generalized 
canons based on a specific definition of knowledge, which must be instantiated as specific 
research canons for a given philosophical foundation. The methodology for this research 
must be consistent with said canons and the associated definition of knowledge. 
The product of the research is an internally consistent philosophical foundation for 
complex situations based on a research methodology using instantiated generalized canons, 
and an application of the associated methodology to derive a decision making construct. 
The contributions to the literature are the maturation of underlying theory for complex 
situations and the generalized research canons. The contribution to theory is the internally 
consistent philosophical foundation for complex situations, the Complex Situations 
Paradigm, and the associated discussion of canons. Finally, the contribution to practice is 
the decision making construct itself, applying the elements of the paradigm to frame action 
at diverse levels in complex situations. 
Areas for further research include the derivation of methods based on the CSP 
methodology; applications of the underlying constructs to facilitate understanding of 
complexity through a method designated forensic complexity, and exploration of CSP 
principles to explore ramifications of cognitive aspects. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Complexity presents itself in various forms such as chaos, wicked problems, non-
linear dynamics, and soft systems, and arises from diverse sources such as mathematics, 
systems theory, dynamics, and biology. However it presents, complexity reveals a 
fundamental characteristic of uncertainty. This challenges traditional modes of thought in 
fields designed to reduce or eliminate uncertainty. Decision-making, in particular, is 
problematic in situations where unpredictable consequences are to be expected and 
traditional deterministic or probabilistic approaches are not appropriate. Systems theory, 
confronted by issues related to complexity, has responded with a wealth of alternative 
methodologies described as soft systems (as contrasted with traditional hard systems). The 
system analyst is then simultaneously enabled and constrained by this host of 
methodologies which by their nature must be uniquely tailored to the problem situation -
and yet the problem retains its inherent uncertainly. Across these and other fields, there is a 
clear need to move beyond traditional deterministic and probabilistic approaches to 
accommodate complexity. 
This fundamental characteristic of uncertainty brings to mind the foundational 
aspects of certainty - knowledge, reality, and the methodologies used to relate the two. 
However, without prejudice to existing methodologies, and acknowledging that some 
methodologies devote significant effort to the underlying paradigm (e.g. Sinn, 1998), this 
has tended to be a dialog of traditional epistemological and ontological perspectives with 
methods and methodologies created and evolved around problem situations. (Sousa-Poza 
This dissertation uses American Psychological Association parenthetical citations. 
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& Correa-Martinez, 2005; Keating, Sousa-Poza, and Kovacic, 2005) and others have 
initiated a dialog exploring constructs for complex situations, framing the discussion 
around the elements of epistemology, ontology and methodology which carries potential to 
enrich research and application via an alternative approach. Indeed, to address an issue that 
confounds traditional approaches, one must explore such alternative approaches beginning 
with the foundational issues of philosophy. 
This research presents a study of the problem, reviewing the literature in the areas 
of complexity, systems and the associated philosophical basis for each. The results of the 
literature review provide the basis for developing the desired construct and the concomitant 
philosophical foundations, but further indicate a need for development of research 
methodologies that reflect the philosophical foundations for the research. This gives rise to 
the notion of generalized research canons - canons derived from a definition of knowledge 
- that are instantiated for a particular philosophical foundation. A Complex Situations 
Paradigm (CSP) is derived from a set of principles indicated from the review of the 
literature, guided by the appropriate instantiation of these generalized research canons. The 
desired decision making construct then becomes a consequence of applying the CSP. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this research is to develop a construct for decision making in 
complex situations using an internally consistent philosophical foundation. 
Research Questions 
In areas of complexity, decision making in the traditional sense is problematic as 
unpredictability is inherent in the situation, especially where deterministic or probabilistic 
3 
approaches are inappropriate. Hence, the overall goal of this research is to gain insights 
into some construct that will facilitate decision-making. Based on the review of the 
literature, one of the salient issues for any such research is proposed to be one of internal 
consistency, namely that derivations and conclusions must be consistent with associated 
philosophical foundations. This point is asserted to be so critical that it is proposed as one 
of the foundational axiological principles for this research; and as such the specific goal of 
the research is to develop an internally consistent decision making construct for complex 
situations: 
Qi: What is an internally consistent decision making construct for complex 
situations? 
This, however, is an action (development of a construct) and not a reason, and so begs the 
simple question why; e.g. what is the reason such a construct needs to be created? To 
attach a benefit to any particular solution is inappropriate - even gross overgeneralizations 
such as increase profit or better mankind presuppose a context that is not yet in existence. 
Therefore, the axiological foundations must also address the notion of this reason why 
(referred to as a value premise) in order to provide a complete expression for the 
philosophical foundations underpinning the decision making construct. 
Study Limitations and Delimitations 
The single most significant limitation is the subject matter itself - complexity. 
Since, by definition, this involves the unpredictable, the study cannot rationally attempt to 
predict the unpredictable and must instead focus on the nature of complexity. This 
limitation is foundational to the general timbre of the research, focusing on philosophical 
foundations so that an understanding of complexity - versus an understanding of that which 
4 
in and of itself is complex - is the central area of study. As will be further outlined, this 
further constrains the research methodology to be strictly accountable to foundational 
principles - which, in practice, obviates the use of many traditional quantitative or 
qualitative approaches. This strict accountability becomes paramount as it must serve as 
one of the principle justifications for the assertions of knowledge claims. 
Significance of the Study 
Sousa-Poza and Correa-Martinez (2005) provide the initial discussion of 
alternative philosophical foundations for complexity and systems, introducing the concept 
of a complex situation. This research furthers that discussion, extending the initial 
philosophical foundation to include epistemological, ontological, axiological and 
methodological underpinnings - forming, arguably, the key elements of a paradigm (Guba 
& Lincoln, 1989; Creswell, 2003). Further, the discussion of research canons suitable for 
alternative philosophical foundations provides a new perspective with the potential to 
enable multi-disciplinary research beyond this particular application. 
The contribution to theory is the internally consistent philosophical foundation for 
complex situations - the express purpose for the research - and the associated discussion of 
canons. Specifically, this research focuses on the subject of complexity itself (as opposed 
to a discussion of causes or symptoms) by addressing the philosophical foundations for 
complexity within the context of a situation, therefore contributing to a unique dialog on 
complexity. 
Finally, the contribution to practice is the decision making construct itself. Though 
this will necessarily be a broad construct, it provides a foundation for discourse on 
reduction to practice in this inherently challenging area - and, as with any research, may 
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hold direct potential for practice. Due to the breadth of the approach, it is reasonable to 
assume that there will be serendipitous discoveries of additional areas of research and 
methods of reduction to practice. 
6 
CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Overview 
The literature review used a tree-based search of electronic databases at Old 
Dominion University Library, using the starting point of Sousa-Poza and Correa-Martinez 
(2005), which was augmented by a search on all the terms system, epistemology, ontology, 
axiology and methodology. For efficiency, database searches concentrated on those 
sources which aggregate multiple journals (specifically JSTOR, Wiley, Sage and the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Xplore databases). This provided a 
sufficiently small but relevant set of references to frame successive searches, with each 
level pruned by a cursory review. The essential results are presented in Figure 1, with the 
analysis of major elements of the review - complexity, systems, and philosophical 
underpinnings - provided in this section. 
Complexity 
As an emerging multidisciplinary field, complexity includes diverse perspectives 
for defining and understanding its meaning, providing the opportunity to assess and adapt 
these perspectives to a particular application. The evolution of thought contributing to 
complexity, through multiple lineages with a concomitant diversity of perspective, speaks 
to underlying principles that are necessarily interpreted through the lens of the parent 
discipline. This diversity can illuminate and confound these underlying principles; yet 
from those principles it is possible to establish a reference point for understanding 
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Figure 1. Research Mind Map 
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There are seemingly as many definitions of complexity as there are references, for 
example: 
We consider a system "complex" if it is composed of diverse components that 
interact in interesting (nonlinear) ways (Center for the Study of Complex Systems, 
2007, para. 1). 
Being anxious to move beyond the semantic debate, we have taken a "complex 
system" to be one whose properties are not fully explained by an understanding of 
its component parts (Gaugher and Appenzeuer, 1999, pg. 79). 
A system perceived as complex induces a characteristic phenomenology the 
principal signature of which is the multiplicity of possible outcomes, endowing it 
with the capacity to choose, to explore and to adapt. This process can be manifested 
in different ways: The emergence of traits encompassing the system as whole that 
can in no way be reduced to the properties of the constituent parts. [.. .and ...] The 
intertwining, within the same phenomenon, of large scale regularities and 
seemingly erratic evolutionary trends (Nicolis and Rouvas-Nicolis, 2007, Section 
!)• 
Complexity theory is a new set of interdisciplinary sciences from which 
explanatory principles and models of complex dynamic systems composed of many 
interacting parts are emerging. It includes chaos theory, and relevant concepts of 
self-organization and emergence (Ren and Yeo, 2005, pg. 695). 
The complexity of a physical system or a dynamical process expresses the degree to 
which components or interactions display nontrivial structure. High complexity is 
achieved in systems that exhibit a mixture of order and disorder (randomness and 
regularity) and that have a high capacity to generate emergent phenomena (Sporns, 
2007, para. 1). 
[Complex systems] are characterized by the nonlinear interactions between many 
elements (Zhang, 2002, pg. 83). 
All of these disparate definitions echo similar themes; concepts of emergence and systems 
(diverse, interdependent, etc.) are common. These two ideas are, to some degree, in 
conflict. A system may or may not be emergent; and if some entity displays emergent 
characteristics in an irreducible fashion then a systems description is not appropriate as it 
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implies a level of reducibility. Such definitions of complexity and complex systems 
represent more of an outgrowth of earlier systems work - e.g. when a system of things 
normally understood reaches a level of interdependency and begins to display emergent 
behavior, it transitions to become an (irreducible) complex system. This conflicting 
terminology is avoided by Sousa-Poza and Correa-Martinez (2005) through the adoption of 
the term complex situation. 
Emergence speaks to the simple fact that something unpredictable can happen. As 
an example, weak emergence is used in one sense (Bedau, 1997) that refers to cases such as 
the creation of a new characteristic from two unrelated characteristics - hydrogen and 
oxygen combining to create water and energy, for example. For this discussion, emergence 
is used in a sense of strong emergence; O'Conner (1994) describes this as a combination of 
"supervenience, non-structurality, and novel causal influence" (pg. 97) - a rich set of 
potentially non-ergodic interactions. 
A tendency in the literature (seen in the definitions above) is to address sources and 
characteristics of complexity - for example, Biggiero (2001), Byrne (2005), and Murray 
(2003) provides categories of complexity, and Rittel and Webber (1973) provide a list of 
characteristics (here, for wicked problems). Less clear is what can be done in the face of 
complexity, though this has produced several approaches broadly grouped as soft systems 
methodologies (e.g. Ackoff, 2001; Checkland, 1999b; Midgley, 2003). Kirk (1995) also 
provides a comparison of hard and soft systems approaches. These represent a type of 
decision construct for complex situations that tend to be solution focused - e.g. given the 
source, minimize the effects or given the characteristics, ameliorate the consequence. 
Richardson (2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2007) provides a sustained discussion oriented on the 
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latter approach. However, it is not necessarily as clear what the solution is or should be -
consider Van Uden, Richardson, and Cilliers (2001) who summarized the consequences as 
follows: "Essentially complexity-based analysis is a move away from the contemporary 
authoritarian style, in which a dominant perspective bounds the analysis, to a more 
democratic, or adhocratic (Waterman, 1990) style that acknowledges the 'rights' and value 
of a range of different discourses" (pg. 13). This clearly reflects a more postmodern 
perspective; but it is relevant to reflect that the unpredictable nature of complexity could, 
from an alternate philosophical perspective, be used as a call for increased authority (e.g., 
Smith, 2003). The U.S. Army's Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design (2008) 
reflects a sort of middle ground between centralized authority and adhocracy - while the 
notion of a central authority and mission remains paramount, this pamphlet encourages a 
strong degree of interaction between the actors supporting a proscribed mission. 
If unpredictability is considered to be at the core of complexity, additional 
characteristics of complexity can be considered as supporting or amplifying that central 
characteristic. Consider several characteristics presented in the earlier discussion: 
interdependence, non-linearity, emergence, and chaos. Interdependence essentially implies 
a system with feedback and feed-forward paths that result in non-linear dynamics, 
particularly with respect to system stability. Non-linear dynamics, aside from potentially 
resulting in systems with no closed-form solution or systems sensitive to initial conditions 
(chaotic), may also result in a loss of linear superposition with the associated loss of 
reducibility. Emergence "arises because the collective behavior is not readily understood 
from the behavior of the parts" (Bar-Yam, 1997, pg. 10); and (as discussed above) can be 
further subdivided into local emergence (where unpredictable behavior arises from a small 
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part of the system) and global emergence where the unpredictable behavior arises from the 
system as a whole. Chaos describes particular kinds of non-linear dynamics which may 
show fractal behavior or include attractors. In summary, through all of the disparate 
concepts of complexity, the notion of unpredictability is a consistent underlying principle. 
Sousa-Poza and Correa-Martinez (2005) significantly generalize this notion of 
unpredictability as the core concept of complexity, defining it as "proportional to the 
probability of having/making an erroneous knowledge claim" (section 3, para. 2). This 
probability of erroneous knowledge claims directly impacts understanding; indeed, 
complexity as "a construct associated with the fallibility of understanding" (section 3, para. 
2). The definition provided by Gaugher and Appenzeuer (1999) also frames complexity 
with respect to understanding. It remains, then, to examine understanding and assess the 
implications of complexity (as so defined). 
A standard definition of understanding is "to comprehend; to apprehend the 
meaning or import of; to grasp the idea o f (OED, 2008). Dewey (1933) speaks to the 
same concept but is more explicit in the impact of understanding: "To grasp the meaning of 
a thing, an event, or a situation is to see it in its relations to other things: to see how it 
operates or functions, what consequences follow from it, what causes it, what uses it can be 
put to. In contrast, what we have called the brute thing, the thing without meaning to us, is 
something whose relations are not grasped. . . . The relation of means-consequence is the 
center and heart of all understanding" (pp. 137,146). 
From this perspective, higher complexity implies a lower probability of establishing 
this means-consequence relation - causality is lost, and the ability to understand is limited 
in kind. Also, understanding rests with the observer; hence complexity in a situation is 
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linked to the observer and the observer's understanding of the situation. An understanding 
of complexity permits the observer to place a low understanding of the situation in context, 
establishing a different form of means-consequence relation for a complex situation where 
the lack of causality is understood to be a characteristic of the situation. From this 
perspective, understanding a complex situation becomes not a paradoxical statement but a 
statement that incorporates the limits of understanding. 
Complexity in a situation therefore directly influences understanding of that 
situation, requiring the observer to understand complexity in order to understand the 
situation in a tractable context. Understanding is related both to knowledge and the ability 
to place that knowledge in context; hence an implication of complexity is a limit to 
understanding of the situation. The concept of understanding a complex situation must be 
refined and ultimately supplanted with the concept of understanding complexity. The 
observer is faced with a situation where the statement / don't know (with respect to the 
complex entity) has been replaced with / can't know, certainly a critical concept to 
understand. 
Treating understanding (and by implication knowledge) as the underlying principle 
behind the diverse lineage of complexity, it is immediately noted that a major shift in 
perspective has occurred - the focus has moved from the monolithic concept of a complex 
thing (or collection of things) to include the observer. Drawing on the complex situation 
construct established by Sousa-Poza and Correa-Martinez (2005), the observer is 
inextricably bound to the complex situation, and so establishes a reference point for 
assessing perspectives on complexity. The impacts on the observer as a reference point can 
then be assessed with respect to this underlying principle. 
13 
This explicit introduction of the observer introduces the requirement for a strong 
analysis of philosophical foundations, including such fundamental issues as epistemology 
and ontology. These discussions are often assumed in engineering subject matter areas 
where positivist empirical approaches are dominant in the discourse - with some notable 
exceptions (e.g. Heylighen, Cilliers & Gershenson, 2007; Georgiou, 2000; Sinn, 1998; 
Sousa-Poza and Correa-Martinez, 2005). The latter proposes pragmatic idealism, 
exploiting ideas of Rescher (1994, 2000) to propose an ontological foundation for 
exploring complexity. Due to this critical emphasis on philosophical foundations for 
discussions involving the observer, this research endeavors to make these philosophical 
assumptions explicit. 
In this sense, complexity directly contradicts the basic assertion of systems concepts 
- systems concepts assert the understanding of the whole as more than the sum of the parts, 
while complexity asserts the loss of the means-consequence relationship that is central to 
understanding. Complexity contradicts the assertion that more knowledge results in more 
understanding; it challenges the notion that reality is fundamentally comprehensible. This 
introduces the concept of fallabalism, which can be taken to be a justification for inaction 
(as no action can be rigorously supported); but as this discussion presumes a value premise 
driving action, the perspective of pragmatic idealism (Sousa-Poza & Correa-Martinez, 
2005) is appropriate. This also foreshadows a consideration of philosophical foundations -




A systems perspective asserts the understanding of the whole as greater than the 
sum of the parts. Systems perspectives are typically considered to have a philosophical 
foundation in empiricism; however, this is shown to not be (in general) internally 
consistent. An internally consistent definition of a systems perspective is required for a 
discussion on notions of complexity and accommodation of complexity. A discussion of 
the assumptions required for an internally consistent systems perspective frames the 
development and application of systems perspectives within complex situations. 
Hellenic philosophy provided two significant concepts that contribute to the 
evolution of systems thought: the notion of systems from Aristotle (1994), or the whole is 
greater than the sum of the parts, and Plato's concepts of dualism (1892) such as 
material/immaterial, or mind/body. The former notion speaks to holism and synthesis; the 
latter speaks to particularism and analysis. Bertalanffy (1968) sums up the analytical trend 
in western scientific thought: "It was the aim of classical physics eventually to resolve 
natural phenomena into a play of elementary units governed by 'blind' laws of nature. This 
was expressed by the ideal of the Laplacean spirit which, from the position and momentum 
of particles, can predict the state of the universe at any point in time" (p. 75). This 
perspective encountered difficulties over time as it became apparent that elements in 
combination can produce results that cannot be constructed from consideration of the 
elements alone, resulting in the conclusion that "It is necessary to study not only parts and 
processes in isolation, but also to solve the decisive problems found in organization and 
order unifying them, resulting from dynamic interaction of parts, and making the behavior 
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of parts different when studied in isolation or in whole" (ibid). From this perspective, a 
system is the whole in the largest sense - it is the whole, the parts and the relationship of 
the parts. This is well summarized by Checkland (1999b): "The systems paradigm is 
concerned with wholes and their properties. It is holistic, but not in the usual (vulgar) sense 
of taking in the whole; systems concepts are concerned with wholes and their hierarchical 
arrangement rather than with the whole" (Chapter 1, 2.1). 
This clearly asserts a causal relationship between the holistic and the particular. The 
very need for the notion of systems is predicated upon a need for understanding - the 
establishment of causality (a fundamental element of the means/consequence relationship 
of Dewey [1933]) - under conditions where consideration of the parts alone will not 
explain the behavior of the whole. This concept is challenged by the notion of complexity 
where understanding is inherently limited - when consideration of the whole does not 
provide the desired means/consequence relationship. Paradoxically, complexity is a 
consequence when a large number of interacting entities are involved - e.g. definition of a 
richly interacting system with a known set of entities, relationships and boundaries 
becomes self-defeating in that understanding becomes inherently limited. From a 
traditional systems perspective, this implies that the system is not well-defined - yet when 
notions of complexity indicate that no systems definition exists that can provide 
understanding, it is necessary to revisit concepts of systems from a different perspective. 
The comment of a need for understanding was presented above, begging the 
question that understanding is required for some reason. This seemingly trivial point 
implies that there is a need for a means/consequence relationship; here, generally taking to 
have ultimate realization in some decision to shape an environment towards some value 
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premise. This further asserts the existence of a capacity of some entity to make a decision 
- e.g. some independent capability to sense, understand, decide and act. The need for 
system concepts is derivative of a need for understanding, which is derivative of a need to 
predict the future so these actions can be oriented towards a desired future. The collision of 
concepts of systems and complexity is apparent; hence to accommodate a discussion on 
complexity a discussion on system concepts must include notions of understanding, 
decision and action. Baecker (2001) states that "systems theoretical thinking is an 
epistemological device to look at the ways in which, by communication, three distinctions 
are established and implemented: (a) the social distinction between actor and observer, (b) 
the ecological distinction between system and environment, and (c) the temporal distinction 
between past, present and future" (pg. 70). This encompasses the elements of the complex 
situation from Sousa-Poza and Correa-Martinez (2005) and frames the elements of 
understanding, decision and action. 
This research seeks to dissect not systems but the concepts of systems in order to 
frame a debate on how these notions relate to complex behaviors. This requires a 
discussion of systems, underlying philosophies, and the role these concepts play in 
understanding. A critical axiological principle is the idea of internal consistency; e.g. that a 
concept must be consistent with its inherent philosophical assumptions (here focusing on 
epistemology and ontology). This is closely related to the Type IV error of Keating (2008) 
relative to Mitroff (1998): engaging a problem/situation with incompatible and 
irreconcilably divergent worldviews, such that success is unattainable. From this basis, a 
discussion of complexity provides a perspective on the role and consequences of system 
concepts as a means to promote understanding. This discussion incorporates this as a 
17 
context for application of systems concepts, asserting a rational foundation that 
appropriately accommodates a necessarily systemic perspective. 
Concepts 
The notion of a system is an ancient, and in one perspective, a well defined concept 
- so well defined that the debate as to the meaning and consequences thereof have 
continued for thousands of years. Bertalanffy (1950b, 1968, 1972), Becht (1974), 
Checkland (1999b), and Francois (1999) provide a history of systems which will not be 
repeated here; the intent of this discussion is simply to frame definitions and consequences 
for further debate. This includes a discussion on the need for understanding which systems 
concepts strive to fulfill, and the philosophical basis for systems concepts. 
Systems definitions can be found in reference, theory and practice: 
A set or assemblage of things connected, associated, or interdependent, so as to 
form a complex unity; a whole composed of parts in orderly arrangement according 
to some scheme or plan; rarely applied to a simple or small assemblage of things 
(OED, 2008). 
A system can be defined as a complex of interacting elements (Bertalanffy, 1950b, 
pg. 143). 
A system comprises dissimilar elements combined in some way to produce a new 
entity with properties that are different from those of any of the constituent 
elements (Lawson, 2005, pg. 1). 
A "system" is a construct or collection of different elements that together produce 
results not obtainable by the elements alone (NASA, 2007, pg. 3). 
These definitions all carry the intellectual genetics of Aristotle: the whole is more than the 
sum of the parts. However, they do not make explicit one key element of the definition: 
that there is a system itself; e.g. it is bounded. Additional qualifiers lead to the notions of 
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an open system or closed system; Bertalanffy (1950a) makes reference to a bound of some 
significance (and foreshadow the issue of incompleteness for later discussion) where 
interactions across the boundary implies an open system. Consequently, this research uses 
a working definition of a system that has characteristics including a boundary, entities, and 
relationships. These do not define a system but are characteristics of a system - it is 
possible to have a boundary, entities, and relationships and not have a situation where the 
whole is more than the sum of the parts. Therefore, a systems concept necessarily asserts 
that understanding of the whole requires an understanding of the entities, relationships and 
boundaries that cannot be attained through consideration of the entities themselves - an 
increment that may be referred to as the systemic delta in understanding, using systemic as 
"of or pertaining to a system" (OED, 2008). Further, the system environment is that which 
is external to the boundary; hence the relationships include those between entities and those 
between entities and the environment. 
NASA (2007) makes understanding another explicit aspect of a system; the need 
for system concepts arises because consideration of the parts is insufficient to understand 
the whole. As outlined earlier, understanding is used here in the sense of OED (2008) and 
Dewey (1933) which focuses on a means-consequence relationship carrying with it an 
implicit presumption of causality. 
Understanding via system concepts carries a tension between analysis and synthesis 
- where analysis seeks "separation of a whole into its component parts" (MW, 2008), 
synthesis is "the composition or combination of parts or elements so as to form a whole" 
(MW, 2008). Though the notion of a system explicitly focuses on synthesis, the definition 
carries with it elements of analysis - an important context for systems concepts as it assigns 
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significance to reconciliation of the two. This tension is also significant as there is an 
implicit notion that one cannot understand the (bounded) whole without an understanding 
of the bounded entities and relationships. A systems perspective intended to be holistic 
carries with its own definition the requirement to be necessarily particular. Further, the 
essence of the holistic vs. particular debate is seen in discussions on categories, or levels, of 
systems that reflect some measure of resolution (in the sense of the inverse of granularity) 
as in Boulding (1956). 
However, subject to the particular ontology used, the elements of a system (entities, 
relationships and boundaries) can considered as knowledge of rational things, and the 
systems perspective is no more than an inclusion of the knowledge necessary to establish 
understanding. In short, system concepts imply that more knowledge results in more 
understanding. While seemingly a trivial assumption, it nonetheless becomes relevant in 
subsequent epistemological discussions. 
System concepts may be held to be empiricist in nature - e.g. that reality itself is a 
system or has systems in it, and understanding is gained through increasing knowledge of 
them. If there exists a definable set of entities, relationships and boundaries then the 
designation is appropriate; but as reality in general does not necessarily make such 
differentiation, this is a constructivist perspective. An empiricist perspective also implies 
that the bounding of a system does not impact understanding - that a system can be isolated 
(or the isolation reduced to a tractable number of finite interactions). This perspective 
implies that reality is comprehensible, and systemic in nature (at least at relevant levels of 
resolution). In this case, if there is error using a systemic perspective it is a result of a 
difference between the representation of the real system and the real system itself that can 
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be ameliorated through learning. However, it is clear that a system is a function of its 
definition so it is equally possible to assert a rational basis for systems - that a system is a 
rational construct intended to be representative of some reality. Given these two 
viewpoints, it is essential to establish a philosophical foundation as a context for framing 
subsequent conclusions toward an internally consistent argument. 
Internal Consistency of the Systems Perspective 
A systems perspective, as discussed earlier, rests on acquiring sufficient knowledge 
of the system itself. Further, the assertion that a bounded domain within reality itself is 
systemic is equivalent to an assertion of a comprehensible reality - since systems concepts 
assert understanding, a bounded domain of reality as a bounded system must be 
understandable. In addition, system concepts also necessarily assert that a bounded portion 
within reality itself can be understood as a system. To be consistent, a systems concept 
must successfully reconcile these assertions. 
A systems representation is limited; by definition, it has bounds. Further, a 
representation of a thing cannot be the thing itself. This distinction of representation of a 
thing and the thing itself can be considered in Kantian terms as phenomena and noumena, 
using a literal interpretation of the concept of noumena as a thing in and of itself. Certainly 
both phenomena and noumena exist and thus are part of reality; and further, changes in 
noumena over time can potentially result in changes in phenomena. In order for the 
systems representation to be representative of reality, it must acknowledge the existence of 
both phenomena and noumena, and therefore must derive a representation of noumena 
based on phenomena and on the noumena of the systems representation itself - which 
asserts a comprehensible causal relationship between noumena and associated phenomena. 
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The direct equivalence of specific phenomena with related noumena is analogous to 
an assertion of a correspondence theory of truth where that which is observed is presumed 
to be directly reflective of reality. To state that the systems representation deduces the 
representation of noumena from phenomena would require this assertion - that phenomena 
are directly reflective of noumena and therefore constitute premises for deduction. 
Considering the bounded nature of the systems representation, this assertion cannot be true 
in general (though it may be true in specific cases); hence the representation of noumena 
and therefore of much of reality must be inductively derived and is therefore subject to 
error (in the deterministic sense; in the probabilistic sense the potential for error is 
acknowledged). In the absence of this direct correspondence, a consequence of this line of 
reasoning is that systems concepts are not in general internally consistent with a purely 
empiricist philosophy: a bounded representation with a fixed resolution cannot 
conclusively represent reality. 
Systems can be purely rational constructs - rational entities, relationships and 
boundaries such as organizations, business practices, or procedures. From a Platonic 
rational ontological perspective, this presumes system-ness to be a universal characteristic 
and a system to be an instantiation of this universal characteristic. However, the general 
tendency is to assert a bounded domain within reality as a system, which is a direct 
assertion of empiricism. In addition, for complex systems, unpredictability itself must be 
accepted as an innate truth - Warfield (2003) directly includes a "science of complexity" 
(pg. 514) within the construct of systems science. As such, systems can be internally 
consistent with rational philosophy, but not in general and not as typically applied. For a 
more specific example of the lack of consistency between a particular perspective on 
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systems and rationalism, consider the ontology for systems from Pickel (2007), which 
clearly expresses an empirical perspective: 
1. Systems are the basic entities of the natural and social world. 
2. Systems are real entities. 
3. There are material, mixed, and non-material systems. 
4. Each concrete system is directly or indirectly related to all other systems 
which form their proximate or distal environment. 
5. While some systems are nested and ordered hierarchically, others are non-
nested and overlap. 
6. Systems have a different spatial and temporal reach. 
7. A system consists of components and their relations with each other 
(organization or structure). Particularly important are, in addition, a 
system's environment (other systems), as well as the key processes 
(dynamics or mechanisms) that make it work. 
8. In addition to linear or proportionate causal effects, there are non-linear or 
disproportionate causal effects, (pg. 394) 
Sousa-Poza and Correa-Martinez (2005) note that a shortcoming in purely 
pragmatic philosophy is addressed by the inclusion of idealism (rejecting the notion of 
fallibalism as removing the basis for action). As a consequence, this research asserts 
pragmatic idealism as a suitable basis, and assesses (among other things) if systems 
concepts are internally consistent within that philosophical framework. This assertion is 
without prejudice to alternative foundations that retain the characteristic of internal 
consistency (e.g. post-modernism) but simply asserts pragmatic idealism is one such 
foundation. 
Philosophical Foundations 
The essential philosophical foundations for this research are broadly construed to be 
the elements of a paradigm. The concept of a paradigm itself is richly debated, but is 
generally consistent with "a conceptual or methodological model underlying the theories 
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and practices of a science or discipline at a particular time; (hence) a generally accepted 
world view" (OED, 2008). Kuhn (1996) used the term to refer to the set of practices that 
define a scientific discipline during a particular period of time; describing what is to be 
observed and scrutinized; the kind of questions that are supposed to be asked and probed 
for answers in relation to this subject; how these questions are to be structured, and how the 
results of scientific investigations should be interpreted. 
In general these can be interpreted as epistemology (study of knowledge), ontology 
(study of being), and methodology. However, Lehmann (2004) provides an interpretation 
that defines a paradigm as a worldview relative to the branches of philosophy: metaphysics, 
epistemology, and ethics. In the latter case, "the praxis for applying the theoretical 
constructs in epistemology into behavioral codes of conduct" (pg. 19). While the branches 
of philosophy are many and varied, and can be debated ad infinitum, this distinction is of 
some import as it shifts the emphasis on how to the ethics that form the basis of how. This 
is reflected by Guba and Lincoln (1994), which discusses a paradigm as comprised of 
epistemology, ontology, axiology and methodology. From this perspective, the notion of 
methodology in isolation is sterile absent a reason or goal for the methodology. 
The generation of a decision-making construct implies the means to make a 
decision; this section presents a brief discussion of epistemology, ontology, decision 
theory, axiology (the study of values), and their relevance to complex situations, ultimately 
concluding that the determination and choice of a desired future state require an internally 
consistent philosophical foundation, including an axiological and methodological basis 
consistent with the selected epistemology and ontology. This choice for complex situations 
is particularly critical, as it requires consideration of axiological principles for decision 
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making under unpredictable (vs. uncertain) circumstances. Since pragmatic idealism is 
proposed as a basis for this research, which provides an epistemological, ontological and 
axiological foundation, decision theory and methodology are a principal focus of the 
review. 
Epistemology 
Markie (2008) provides a definition of rationalism as the adoption of at least one of 
three claims: 
The Intuition/Deduction Thesis: Some propositions in a particular subject area, S, 
are knowable by us by intuition alone; still others are knowable by being deduced 
from intuited propositions. 
The Innate Knowledge Thesis: We have knowledge of some truths in a particular 
subject area, S, as part of our rational nature. 
The Innate Concept Thesis: We have some of the concepts we employ in a 
particular subject area, S, as part of our rational nature (Section 1.1). 
An alternate perspective is that of empiricism, which can be briefly stated via the "The 
Empiricism Thesis: We have no source of knowledge in S or for the concepts we use in S 
other than sense experience" (Markie, 2008, Section 1.2). In the simplest perspective, the 
opposition of rationalism to empiricism is in the source of knowledge: it is either derived 
from reason or from experience - and in the extreme sense, it is derived solely from one 
source or the other. These positions are echoed in the philosophical perspectives of 
positivism which in the purest sense holds all knowledge to be gained through experiential 
means, and constructivism which in the purest sense holds all knowledge to be constructed 
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within the intellect. A critical discussion of constructivism is found in Olssen (1996), 
which places it in the context of realism. 
This debate of the rational vs. the experiential is traceable to positions set forth by 
Plato and Aristotle. Plato (1892) held that ideas (eidos, or Forms) are real and universal and 
matter is a specific instantiation of a form. Therefore treeness is real and the tree is an 
instance of treeness - agreeing that a thing is a tree constitutes implicit agreement on the 
treeness of the thing. This hints at an underlying assumption of the duality of the material 
and immaterial - or body and soul - within Platonic philosophy; the mind is seen as 
distinct from reality and therefore perceptions within the mind have a fundamental reality. 
In a sense, knowing is unique and real, and the known is an instantiation of knowing - and 
therein lies the root of rationalism and constructivism. Concisely phrased, reality is a 
subset of knowledge. In this perspective, the presence of the duality is central to the 
construct. Conversely, Aristotle (1994) submits that a particular substance is a combination 
of both matter and form; in this view, universals exist only as they are instantiated. 
Therefore, the tree is real, and treeness is a quality of the tree. The essence of the argument 
is the existence of a unitary objective reality; something that knows is part of this reality, 
hence knowing is subsumed by reality. In concise phrasing, knowledge is a subset of 
reality. The diametrically opposed conclusions of the two philosophical perspectives 
reflect back to the notion of internal consistency with philosophical foundations. A 
perspective that rests upon a duality (whether material/immaterial or mind/body) permits 
subsuming one to the other; a perspective that rests on a unity necessarily subsumes all to 
that unity. 
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The comparison across the extremes of rationalist and empiricist epistemology 
represents only a fraction of the overall epistemic debate. Rosenberg (2005) provides an 
in-depth summary of the history of this dialog with respect to the philosophy of science; of 
particular interest is the assertion that empiricism has a preeminent role as "the 'official' 
epistemology of science" (pg. 23). This dialog evolved into post-positivism or 
postmodernism, emphasizing (in various forms) the role of the observer in not only the 
collection of data and generation of knowledge, but the development of the questions that 
frame inquiry. The introduction of this degree of epistemic relativism poses a serious 
challenge to a rigorous definition of knowledge generation - as Popper (1934) stated, "We 
do not know, we can only guess" (pg. 278). This indicates the need for significant caution 
and clarity when departing from the (asserted) assured reality of empiricist epistemology. 
As pragmatic idealism (Sousa-Poza & Correa-Martinez, 2005) introduces both the observer 
and the solution form (the form of interaction) in the complex situation, this degree of rigor 
in the generation of knowledge claims is essential for the proposed research, van Uden et 
al. (2001) and Cilliers (1998) also explore the relationship between postmodernism and 
complexity; in these cases they tend to reduce the uncertainty to an application-focused 
level (e.g. more agile, more flexible, more responsive) that displays a transformative 
teleology within a formative environment (Stacey, 2000). 
Finally, Azzouni (2004) provides a set of epistemic conditions for observations that 
reflect a "tracking" requirement: 
• What's observed is largely independent of what observers expect to see in the 
sense that what they'll observe can contradict what they expect to observe. 
(What they observe is in significant ways independent of what they believe 
about what they'll observe.) 
• There are (autonomous) means of adjusting and refining observations [-] one 
can move for a closer look, for example, or squint. By 'autonomous', [sic] I 
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mean that these methods are learnt and executed in ways largely independent of 
our theories about our senses; we practice navigating by our sense, and not by 
applying theories about how our senses work. 
• What's observed can be monitored, either in the sense of detecting what things 
observed do over time (watching an insect), or in the sense that time can be 
taken to explore different aspects of them (climbing a mountain). 
• Certain properties of the object observed can be used to explain why, and in 
what respects, observed things can be observed (pg. 383). 
This reflects the interdependency between epistemology and ontology: "The 
epistemic processes, which establish truths that we're committed to, must be sensitive to 
the objects about which we're establishing those truths" (pg. 372), which reinforces the 
rational requirement for consistency across the elements of the philosophical foundation. 
Ontology 
General approaches to the nature of existence tend to focus on the differentiation 
between an objective reality (realism) and a subjective (or constructed) reality (non-
realism, under various forms such as post-modernism). Miller (2005), Feyerabend (1981) 
and Vandenberghe (1999) outline the debate in some detail, the latter being from the 
perspective of sociological theory. In this instance, a more precise focus as defined by 
Rescher (2000) is used. The pragmatic assertion is that of a mind-independent reality in 
order: 
1. To preserve the distinction between true and false with respect to factual 
matters and to operate the idea of truth as agreement with reality 
2. To preserve the distinction between appearance and reality, between our picture 
of reality and reality itself 
3. To serve as a basis for intersubjective communication 
4. To furnish the basis for a shared project of communal inquiry 
5. To provide for a fallabilistic view of human knowledge 
6. To sustain the causal mode of learning and inquiry and to serve as the basis for 
objectivity of experience (pg. 100). 
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Note that this preserves aspects of realism and non-realism, in a manner similar to 
postmodernism. These distinctions provide a sense of direction for subsequent 
development. Having established the distinction for the observer, pragmatic idealism 
rejects fallabalism not in the sense that error can be present, but in the sense that action 
must still be taken (e.g. a decision must be made). Further, the notions of causality and 
learning are directly related to knowledge generation, and indicate that this foundation can 
be related to understanding. Finally, there is an emphasis on intersubjective 
communication and communal inquiry that indicates the need to address multiple actors 
involved in knowledge generation. 
Decisions and Decision Theory 
A discussion on decisions can tractably begin with a discussion not just of what 
they are, but why they are. A decision - "to come to a conclusion, make up one's mind; 
determine, resolve" (OED, 2008) - represents a choice between perceived alternatives. 
This very aspect of choice presumes that 1) an individual exists to make the choice, that 2) 
two or more alternatives exist and that 3) there is a reason to prefer one over the other. 
Decisions as a result must have an underlying ontology and epistemology - there is an 
assertion of a reality (something to decide about), knowledge of that reality (choices to 
decide between) and an awareness of reality and choices (self-awareness in some form). 
Decision theory is the selection between alternatives based on preference; or 
alternatively phrased, "decision theory is concerned with goal-directed behavior in the 
presence of options" (Hannson, 1994, pg. 6). A significant body of work exists with 
respect to decision theory in general; a brief history is provided in the introduction to 
Fishburn (1964), an accessible discussion is provided by Hannson (1994) and an in-depth 
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discussion is provided by von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) and Raiffa (1968). This 
discussion is largely concerned with an analytic approach to rationalize decision making -
to develop quantifiable means that result in guidance for selection of an alternative. These 
approaches fall into the broad categories of normative and descriptive decision theory; a 
normative decision theory is a theory about how decisions should be made, and a 
descriptive theory is a theory about how decisions are actually made. 
Of interest here are the elements of decision theory relevant to the philosophical 
elements of epistemology, ontology, methodology and axiology; a brief review of the 
major elements of thought in decision theory provides a basis for extending the discussion 
to these considerations. In the process, this discussion omits a significant body of work to 
focus on essential elements for such considerations, but in a general sense decision theory 
emphasizes probabilistic perspectives illustrated by Expected Utility approaches, in both 
classical and modern applications. 
The central problem of decision theory is making decisions in uncertain 
circumstances. Classical (Bayesian) approaches seek to make decision making tractable 
through a set of assumptions that assert a rational agent; for example, Hannson (1994) 
summarizes Bayesianism as: the Bayesian subject has a coherent set of probabilistic 
beliefs; the Bayesian subject has a complete set of probabilistic beliefs; when exposed to 
new evidence, the Bayesian subject changes his (her) beliefs in accordance with his (her) 
conditional probabilities, and finally, Bayesianism states that the rational agent chooses the 
option with the highest expected utility (pg. 37-38). Based on these assumptions, various 
laws of probability theory are applied, assigning probabilities to consequences that are 
ultimately assessed relative to some value premise. The premise of a rational agent has 
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been the subject of much effort associated with classical expected utility approaches; 
considerations other than probabilistic often impact decision making, and the difficulties in 
accommodating these impacts are the subject of significant later work. Utility theory and 
games (e.g. von Neumann & Morgernstern, 1950; Wald, 1950) represent efforts to increase 
the robustness of these approaches; Savage (1954) developed Subjective Expected Utility 
(SEU) as a concept to accommodate issues with the rational agent concept. SEU 
"postulates a preference structure, depicted axiomatically, permitting the numerical 
expression of the decision maker's valuation of the consequences by a utility function, that 
of his beliefs by a (subjective) probability measure on the set of all events, and the 
evaluation of acts by the mathematical expectations of the utility with respect to the 
subjective probability" (Kami, 2005, pg. 4). 
Additionally, dialog in decision theory has incorporated various structures, phases 
or stages for decision making - an example is found in Dewey (1910, pgs. 72-77), where 
problem-solving consists of five consecutive stages: (1) a felt difficulty, (2) the definition 
of the character of that difficulty, (3) suggestion of possible solutions, (4) evaluation of the 
suggestion, and (5) further observation and experiment leading to acceptance or rejection of 
the suggestion. Though numerous such organizations are available, the essential element 
for this discussion is the trend towards analysis - the dissection of the problem to a level 
tractable for metrification of consequence for assessment relative to some value premise. 
Also, the basis asserted for a decision is derived through analysis - a dissection of 
consequences given means - hence if this analysis is improper the basis for a decision is 
improper. As an example, given a selected epistemology and ontology, a perspective 
treating an irreducible as a reducible will by definition create a lack of understanding and 
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defeat analysis. Another example is seen from a systems perspective, where incorrect 
bounding of a construct for reality can omit entities and/or relationships and therefore 
introduce error in the determination of consequence. The ability to analyze - again a 
function of being and knowing - is implicit in the ability to make a decision. 
Decision theory provides a significant body of work to treat diverse interpretations 
- probabilistic, subjective, both, and others - but the common themes are analysis and 
metrification. Further, though all of these approaches deal with making difficult decisions 
(those where the consequences relevant to the value premise are not immediately apparent), 
in both simple and difficult decisions the fundamental requirement is that there is some 
means to determine consequence and some value premise permitting some metrification of 
choice through assigning objective or subjective values to consequence. A consistent 
philosophical foundation for decision theory must therefore accommodate analysis, 
providing some means to determine value and consequence. The former speaks to 
axiology, the latter to ontology and epistemology. 
Axiology 
Axiology (from the Greek to speak of values) is a branch of philosophy addressing 
the study of value (OED, 2008). Value is "the relative status of a thing, or the estimate in 
which it is held, according to its real or supposed worth, usefulness, or importance" (OED, 
2008). Value theory therefore has a significant breadth of subject matter: "acts or 
processes of mind involved in our responding, appraising, and judging and in the creation 
of values ... concepts we make use of in these acts or processes of evaluation ... the 
presentation of completely general and ultimate apprasive concepts such as good" 
(Aschenbrenner, 1971, pg. 4). The breadth of inquiry is further illustrated by Jessup (1949): 
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"Among writers on value there seems to be fair agreement that these things include: (1) 
value-feelings (pleasures and pains and affective dispositions; (2) volitional activity (based 
on felt tensions), setting up ends or purposes, the drive toward which is not simply additive 
of the moments or points of felt-pleasures along the way; (3) value-judgment (appraisal or 
evaluation), which may reject, censure, or approve of both feeling and will; (4) the value 
objective, which may be any thing, quality or situation, actual or ideal, and of any degree of 
intricacy" (pg. 127). Keeney (1992) provides a treatment of the role of values in decision-
making, contrasting value-focused thinking to alternative focused thinking - in particular 
focusing on the ability to create decision opportunities. Notwithstanding the breadth of 
inquiry for value theory as illustrated in the above and in Hart (1971), elements of interest 
for this discussion include those related to being, knowledge and praxis (Lehmann, 2004). 
The notion of value necessarily requires a subject and a predicate, or a judgment 
and a subject of the judgment - both valuing and valued entities are presumed. These are 
essential ontological assertions towards the existence of each; however, no further 
assertions are required at this level of definition. Whether a rationalist, empiricist, realist, 
pragmaticist or other ontological foundation is asserted, all can result in valued and valuing 
entities. Rational foundations may assert entities derived through reason; empiricist 
foundations may assert an experiential basis for the same. In a broad sense, then, axiology 
is dependent upon an ontological foundation - whether it is derivative of this same 
foundation remains to be examined. 
The epistemological foundations for axiology are clear in the sense that knowledge 
of the thing valued is available (though again the specific philosophy may vary). However, 
from the descriptions quoted above there are additional aspects to be examined - the above 
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quotations make clear reference to value as both individual and situational. That there is 
even a debate on values indicates there is variation across individuals - the concept of 
subjective expected utility is a mechanization of this variation. Either values are universal 
and constant and the discovery of these values differs across individuals, or values are 
individual and situational and consequently differ across individuals. Therefore, as with 
the earlier ontological argument, axiology will be dependent upon and derivative of an 
epistemological foundation. 
The extent of this dependency is significant as the discussion of value requires a 
discussion on the nature of self-awareness. That there is a need to choose indicates a 
reason to choose - i.e. there is some purposive end for the individual making the decision. 
Though the dialog on values (and decisions) deals with far more pragmatic ends, at the 
heart of the dialog there is an assumption of an ultimate purposive end that creates the need 
for a self-aware individual to make a choice. Further, this requires the ability to create 
some representation of alternatives, and discern some benefit towards the ultimate 
purposive end. These ideas are implicit in value theory and decision theory and must be 
accounted for in the supporting ontological and epistemological foundations. 
In the extreme, this becomes a debate as to whether axiological foundations exist 
independent of self-awareness. In the total absence of self-awareness, there is by the above 
arguments no valuing entity, and the debate is reduced to the notions of value independent 
of valuation - an inconsistent concept unless the ontological foundation asserts value as an 
inherent characteristic of existence, one that is discovered in the presence of self-awareness 
rather than assigned. Hence there are two cases to consider: either value is assigned by the 
valuing entity, in which case there is an ontological assertion of existence and self-
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awareness and a derivation of value through epistemological assertions; or it exists as an 
ontological assertion and is revealed through an epistemological assertion. The former 
presents a constructivist perspective, the latter a positivist perspective - but in both cases it 
can be asserted that axiology is not only dependent on ontology and epistemology, but 
derivative of them as well. As methodology has already been presented as requiring a 
reason (value) for application, the complete suite of a study of being, knowledge, values 
(derivative of the same), and praxis (methodology) then forms a coherent structure for a 
paradigm. 
In summary, axiology as the study of values possesses certain key characteristics 
relevant to decision theory: 
• it presumes a reality, including the valuing entity and the thing valued; 
• it presumes a valuing entity to have knowledge of the thing valued; 
• it is dependent on and derivative of an epistemological and ontological 
foundation, and 
• it presumes an individual with some ultimate purposive ends for valuing. 
Further, decision theory provides an additional key characteristic that there must be some 
analytical means to determine consequences of courses of action. 
Complexity, Axiology, and Decision Theory 
Understanding implies a sense of causality - the "means/consequence relationship" 
(Dewey, 1933, pg. 146) - that is at odds with unpredictability. For decision theory, the 
impacts are significant - much of decision theory deals with uncertain circumstances, not 
unpredictable circumstances. Under uncertain circumstances, behaviors are stochastic 
whereas in unpredictable circumstances, behaviors are neither stochastic nor deterministic. 
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The adoption of a time-independent perspective as opposed to a time-dependent 
perspective does not necessarily result in any change in the probability of an erroneous 
knowledge claim within the perspective. Unpredictable behaviors, for example, may be 
chaotic (deterministic but having such sensitivity to initial conditions that future outcomes 
cannot be determined to an arbitrary degree of accuracy) or complex (emerging from rich 
interactions of multiple entities). Further, complex behaviors are sensitive to history -
every instance is unique and will have a unique associated future. In such cases it is not 
possible to quantify consequences - e.g. assign a probability to outcomes - as any such 
assignation has as little or as much meaning as any other. The selection of a given choice 
becomes irrelevant under such circumstances; simply put if it is not possible to know what 
outcome will occur in the instance or over time, it is not possible to choose between 
outcomes. 
In such conditions, notions of assigning value to outcomes may seem moot as 
nothing can be done with the assigned value. However, it is appropriate to consider that 
considerations of value may return to a more fundamental discussion on the reason for 
making a decision - the notion that there is a purposive end. Consideration of decision-
making, and the associated axiological foundations, returns to the reason to make a 
decision at all - which, per the earlier discussion, is dependent upon and derivative of 
ontological and epistemological foundations for axiology and decision making. This must 
be phrased in a manner that incorporates those cases where consequence can be defined 
(e.g. there is a prior distribution) and where value can be assigned (e.g. there is a utility 
function). As consequence and value have been previously asserted to be based on some 
selected philosophical foundation, any consideration must be internally consistent with 
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those foundations; hence the basic assertion is that a decision is justifiable if it is internally 
consistent with philosophical foundations. Here, justification is used in the sense of "To 
show or maintain the justice or reasonableness of (an action, claim, etc.); to adduce 
adequate grounds for; to defend as right or proper" (OED, 2008). Rather than serving as an 
axiomatically specific term, it instead captures the conceptual subtleties of operations in 
unpredictable circumstances where the basis for decision is not clear - certainly not in the 
traditional sense, and potentially not clear in any sense. This is reflected by Aliseda (2004): 
"explanations are public objects of 'justification', [sic] that can be checked and tested by 
independent logical criteria" (pg. 341), and further by Rescher (2009a): "The prime 
directive of cognitive rationality is to maintain consistency" (pg. 3). The logical criteria are 
provided by the philosophical foundations - a rational deductive approach. 
Finally, this must be stressed as a necessary axiological principle but it is by no 
means asserted to be sufficient - there will almost certainly be additional axiological 
considerations in every particular situation (for example, ethics, morality, etc.) that are not 
treated here. The justification principle is highlighted here as particularly relevant to this 
discussion, for decisions both in research and in practice must be similarly justified. 
Therefore internal consistency, including a robust axiology, is a requirement for both 
research and practice. 
Methodology 
Kieseppa (2000) presents methodology as one of the principle consequences for 
epistemological and ontological choices. Mingers (2003) provides a summation of 
methodology as the general study of methods of intervention or research (as in a course in 
Research Methodology); the particular methods used in a specific project or study (as in 
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"what was your research methodology?"); and a generic combination of methods that is 
commonly used as a whole (as in soft systems methodology, strategic options development 
and analysis, or survey methodology covering the design and analysis of questionnaires) 
(pg. 559). Methodology is distinct from methods; for example the methodology 
traditionally associated with logical positivism is the process of empirical scientific inquiry. 
Popper (1934) regarded methodological rules as conventions - the "rules of the game of 
empirical science" (pg. 53) (which indicates the association held with methodology at that 
time). Development of a methodology cannot focus on rules, but the way in which rules 
are to be generated. To speak of a quantitative or qualitative methodology is not 
necessarily consistent as these presuppose a specific method - not the guidance for 
generating specific instantiations of a method. 
Further, Guba and Lincoln (1989) emphasize the growing tendency to shift "across 
paradigms" (p. 157) in methods. This raises serious issues with the notions of internal 
consistency; of course, it is not necessarily an issue when moving between methods that are 
consistent with a given methodology - for example, both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches can be consistent with empiricist epistemology. This tendency cannot be held 
to be true across diverse epistemic foundations; again caution and clarity is demanded. 
Axiological and methodological components of the foundation will naturally have a 
focused relationship; Lauden (1986) notes that "The methodology of inquiry has to be 
supplemented by the axiology of inquiry" (pg. 351). In practice, this indicates the need for 
co-development of these elements of the foundation. 
A methodology may well be seen as an a posteriori meta-construct for a collection 
of methods developed for inquiry within an overall philosophical foundation, which 
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provides little guidance for a priori development. However, it can be framed from the 
definition focusing on the "rules" for scientific inquiry, which leads to the assertion of the 
tautological relationship that a research methodology must provide guidance for the 
selection of methods for generating knowledge within a given philosophical foundation. 
The reference to methods for generating knowledge immediately brings to mind canons for 
research. These are generally used as conventions for the design and execution of research, 
but the requirement is highly similar and thus suggests a close relationship between 
methodology and research canons. This also incorporates a subject that is not often 
explicitly treated in research methodologies - the definition of knowledge itself. From this 
perspective, development of a methodology can use the other elements of the philosophical 
foundation and research canons to facilitate selection or generation of methods for research. 
This is illustrated in Figure 2, which will be further augmented in the discussion on 
research canons below. 












Figure 2= Initial Relationship of Methodology, Canons and Methods 
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As further guidance for the initial direction of the research, given that the 
methodology must be developed in concert with the other elements of the paradigm, it may 
be possible to exploit known relationships between those other elements. An example of 
this can be found in (Rescher, 1998) illustrating the tension between the "ontological and 
epistemological dimensions" (pg. 114): 
[Ontological] [Epistemological] 
Unexplainable Not (yet) explained 
By chance By some cause we do not know of 
Spontaneous Caused in a way we cannot identify 
Random Lawful in ways we cannot characterize 
By whim For reasons not apparent to us (pg. 114) 
By way of comparison, Pickel (2007) presents a methodology for systems as follows: 
1. The conception of system is basic to and relates all sciences and disciplines. 
Individual humans are both systems and components of systems. 
2. Systems exist independent of the models, conceptualizations, or theories 
through which we try to understand and explain them. 
3. Materialist and idealist reductionisms in the social sciences are rejected. 
4. Conceptualizations in terms of "part-whole" or "base-superstructure" are 
insufficient to capture the complex order of real social systems. 
5. Conceptualizations for more complex orderings need to be developed. 
6. Time and space are crucial dimensions in accounting for systems (e.g., path 
dependency, co-evolution). 
7. While the concept of system as entity may suggest stasis, the mechanisms or 
dynamics of any system are central in explaining emergence, persistence, and 
dissolution of concrete systems. 
8. Causal relationships cannot be inferred from linear correlations (pg. 394). 
This is a blend of higher level assertions (conception of systems is basic), rules for practice 
(account for time and space), and constraints (cannot be inferred) that may assist in 
developing methods - though more explicit framing may be desired in practice. 
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CHAPTER III: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Overview 
The research design centers around the proposed knowledge claims: a decision 
making construct internally consistent with philosophical foundations. The development 
of philosophical foundations dictates a rational deductive approach with the concomitant 
emphasis on credible premises and defensible arguments. The decision making construct 
itself must be derived to be consistent with the philosophical foundation, again dictating a 
rational deductive approach. The issue of external validation (or the equivalent form as 
specified by the research canons) is problematic for complex situations; no matter how 
much data is collected it is disingenuous to presume that conclusions based on prior data 
will be predictive of future events - when those events are unpredictable in neither the 
temporal domain (deterministic) nor the frequency domain (probabilistic). The initial 
purpose of the study was refined based on literature review and methodology development 
to capture this issue; it speaks of justification of the construct (e.g. internal consistency with 
philosophical foundations). The fundamental characteristics of complexity restrict the 
notion of proof - aside from the postmodern claims of relativism and fallabilism based on 
the nature of inductive reasoning, there is no single solution for unpredictable events. As 
such, this research is necessarily constrained to an assessment of decision-making within 
that environment - not the environment itself- and must acknowledge that canons such as 
repeatability will not be applicable across cases. The goal of the research is to develop the 
decision-making construct, providing insights for the analyst to apply to a particular 
situation. This requires a deliberate assessment of canons and their role in research 




The purpose of research is to gain knowledge. Credible research requires rigorous 
consideration of what knowledge is and how it can be gained, expressed as canons for 
research. Though canons may vary across particular research communities, the purpose 
remains the same: to ensure knowledge is developed in a defensible manner. This defense 
must necessarily include ontological considerations of the nature of being; there is 
something to be known and there is someone to know it. Since knowing is itself an 
epistemological statement, research canons must possess an epistemological and 
ontological perspective. For research in areas with different philosophical perspectives, the 
duality present in various branches of philosophy (positivism / constructivism, rationalism / 
empiricism, etc.) may demand choices that will preclude building some forms of 
knowledge and enable building others. The choice of canons becomes critical for the 
researcher in areas sensitive to such variations in perspective; but for multi-disciplinary 
research such as complexity considerations of canons and reconciliation of potential 
dichotomies in resulting knowledge claims becomes both paramount and problematic. As 
discussed above, canons also hold a close relationship with methodology. 
Rather than building canons on disparate foundational philosophical perspectives, 
they can be constructed on a common element for reconciliation - knowledge - to yield a 
set of "generalized research canons" based on a specific definition of knowledge. These 
generalized canons, applied to a particular philosophical perspective, instantiate a specific 
set of research canons; allowing resulting knowledge claims, even though derived from 
The content of the generalized canons section, generated in the course of this research, was previously published as 
(Brewer, V., & Sousa-Poza, A, 2009) and is used here, by permission of the authors, for completeness in presenting the 
research. 
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potentially irreconcilable philosophical perspectives, to retain common reference points for 
reconciliation. 
Research Canons 
A canon is "a general rule, fundamental principle, aphorism, or axiom governing 
the systematic or scientific treatment of a subject" (OED, 2009). Canons are presented in 
the literature on research methods, sometimes as rules (Munck, 1994) or procedures 
(Corbin & Strauss, 1990). They are developed within specific disciplines to meet the 
particular requirements of the discipline; a treatment of canons for qualitative research 
(King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994; Guba & Lincoln, 1994), quantitative or mixed methods 
(Creswell, 2007) yields different results. The common end state is a set of guidelines, 
procedures and rules for the conduct of credible research within the discipline. 
A point not emphasized in these treatments is the end state of research itself. In the 
above definition for canons, the notion of scientific as "producing knowledge" (OED, 
2009) is illustrative - the end state of research is to build knowledge, accompanied by 
concomitant epistemological and ontological issues. Canons evolved within a given 
discipline to enable credible research, and in doing so they necessarily instantiated a 
philosophical perspective appropriate to that discipline. This implies the existence of an 
unstated canon common to all instances: that of internal consistency with philosophical 
foundations. However, philosophical foundations for canons are not explicitly addressed in 
the literature (with some exceptions). 
Bozkurt and Sousa-Poza (2005) provide a review and analysis of research canons 
which, in addition to asserting the requirement for internal consistency with underlying 
philosophy, generates generalized categories of canons for the dualistic perspectives of 
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positivism and constructivism (Table 1). These incorporate considerations of other 
categories of canons, such as Pickard and Dixon (2001) and Guba (1992). 











Other sets of canons can be grouped (subject to debate and discourse) within these 
categories; Table 2 provides an illustrative grouping of rules from (King et al., 1994) within 
this framework. 
However, the categories in (Bozkurt & Sousa-Poza, 2005) were derived by 
abstracting common themes in existing sets of canons. The ability to place another set of 
canons within those categories only serves to illustrate that a higher level of abstraction is 
possible. This is the case illustrated in Figure 3, where the explicit or implicit philosophical 
foundations are the basis for building knowledge - which then leads to difficulties in 







Inability to Reconcile Disparate Philosophical Perspectives 
Figure 3. Application of Research Canons 
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Table 2. (King et al., 1994) Canons Mapped to (Bozkurt & Sousa-Poza, 2005) 
Categories 











Illustrative Comparison to 
(King et al., 1994) 
Logical Consistency 
Conditional Independence I (independent explanatory 
variables) 
Leverage (explain as much as possible with as little as 
possible) 
Relevance I (real-world) 
Relevance II (scholarly) 
Omitted variable bias 
Efficiency (did you ignore that which does not?) 
Indeterminacy I: Sufficient cases 
Indeterminacy II: Single explanatory variable 
Unit homogeneity (consistency within cases) 
Conditional independence II (cases really are independent) 
Selection Bias 
Validity of data collection 
Reliability of data collection 
Replicability of data collection 
Level of generality 
Blindness (do not use old data to test old theories) 
Testability 
Falsifiability 
Summarize data with focus on outcome 
Honesty (report weakness in case selection biases) 
Honesty (report measurement errors) 
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Also, though the incorporation of philosophical perspectives addresses the 
"unstated canon" of internal consistency, it does not address canons as a means to 
accomplish the fundamental goal of research - building knowledge. The first step in this 
process, then, is to define knowledge. 
Knowledge 
The definition of knowledge is both an ancient and ongoing discussion in the 
literature, warranting its own branch of philosophy (epistemology). The intent here is not 
to repeat this rich discussion, but instead to accept the generally held Platonic definition -
and therefore accept the debate and limitations associated with that definition. As will be 
seen, even this approach requires accepting some initial choices to enable application of the 
definition. 
The Platonic definition of knowledge is belief with some account (Plato, 1892), 
generally referred to as a Justified True Belief (JTB). Gettier (1963) demonstrated that 
issues arise with the reliability of justification. This is further discussed in Lehrer and 
Paxson (1969), who assert that the JTB must be undefeated, and Goldman (1967), who 
asserts that the JTB must be causal (the latter holding some implication for dealing with 
complexity). These discussions, and others, are generally applied to create a definition of 
JTB(+), where the (+) indicates additional criteria to address Gettier conditions. In order to 
develop a suitable foundational definition of knowledge, the (+) must be rendered into a 
suitable form for discussion. 
A basic lexicon can be established to develop the JTB(+) construct, starting with 
the notion of belief. The inclusion of the qualifier true belief' belies that an individual can 
have beliefs that may or may not be true; here referred to as ideas in the sense of "mental 
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image, conception, notion" (OED, 2009). A belief then becomes an idea held by an 
individual to be true - either a reflection of reality in terms of direct correspondence with 
reality or a true reflection of reality in terms of coherence with a set of propositions related 
to reality. The establishment of the truth of this belief for the individual then constitutes 
that individual's justification - in other words, justified implies the assertion that an 
individual's true belief can be communicated to others. Examples of these may include 
beliefs held on faith - an individual may hold them to be a true belief, but also be cognizant 
that the justification is so personal as to negate communication. In order to establish a 
belief as knowledge, there must be some manner by which another individual can accept 
this belief as justified and true - i.e. the reliability of justification addressed by the Gettier 
conditions. 
In moving to an expression of (+), it is appropriate to note that the ultimate goal 
incorporates a process perspective - that of building knowledge - and must therefore 
address both process (building) and substantive (knowledge) perspectives. In the most 
general sense, the (+) must capture these two perspectives. The process component of 
reliable justification may be designated as a method - "a special form of procedure or 
characteristic set of procedures employed (more or less systematically) in an intellectual 
discipline or field of study as a mode of investigation and inquiry" (OED, 2009). Likewise, 
the substantive component of reliable justification may be designated as the context - the 
parts that surround the justification and give it meaning. 
However, Kirkham (1984) explicitly states that justification "cannot be improved 
by insisting that ... premises must be arrived at by a reliable method" (pg. 506). Given a 
variety of methods, one must determine a method that is reliable - an additional criteria that 
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invites infinite regress. The use of reliable method here must be associated with reliable 
context - there must be some reason to presume the method is reliable, though that 
presumption may engender associated issues. 
One impact of this definition is that it takes more than one person to build 
knowledge. This may be resolved in the sense of the lexicon presented above - but this 
does little to prevent misinterpretations in broader use. An individual may hold that he or 
she has knowledge in the JTB(+) sense - a knowledge claim - but if another individual 
rejects the justification, method or context then the knowledge claim does not rigorously 
meet JTB(+) criteria. In this sense, a justified true belief implies that an individual asserts 
meeting the JTB(+) criteria independent of the judgment of another individual, and 
knowledge to be that which fully meets the JTB(+) criteria. In either case, research canons 
must acknowledge this aspect of the JTB(+) definition in generating formalized 
representation of the criteria to build knowledge between individuals. To summarize the 
lexicon: 
• Idea: A mental image, conception, notion (OED, 2009). 
• Belief: An idea held to be true. 
• True Belief: A belief held to be reflective of reality. 
• JTB: The assertion that an individual's true belief can be communicated 
(externally justified). 
This progression ultimately results in: 
• Knowledge Claim: The assertion of a JTB(+). 
• Knowledge: The acceptance of a JTB(+). 
This definition presumes an ontological foundation (the existence of someone who knows 
and someone to whom that knowledge is justified) and an epistemological foundation (that 
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there is knowing). Further, there is an implication that there is variation across individuals; 
otherwise such justification would not be necessary. 
Generalized Research Canons for JTB(+) 
If one accepts the JTB(+) definition of knowledge, and that research canons seek to 
build knowledge, then these canons should be directly traceable to the asserted definition of 
knowledge. By way of comparison to Figure 3, Figure 4 presents the objective condition: 
the derivation of generalized canons from a definition of knowledge such that there is some 
basis for reconciling knowledge claims across disparate philosophical foundations. 
Figure 4. Application of Generalized Research Canons 
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Following the lexicon presented earlier, this discussion begins with what would 
ultimately become knowledge: a belief. The first canon is therefore the assertion of the 
truth of the belief; i.e. that it is reflective of reality. Truth is used in the sense of "consistent 
with fact; agreeing with the reality; representing the thing as it is" (OED, 2009). This is not 
inconsistent with a representation of the unreal, as the representation itself is real; but it 
does speak to the notion of a representation as reflective of reality. The assertion of truth 
begins with an idea as a construct within the individual; one that an individual would hold 
either as reflection of reality in terms of direct correspondence with reality or a true 
reflection of reality in terms of coherence with a set of propositions related to reality. In a 
general sense, the former can be held to be a subset of the latter - that is, correspondence 
with reality is coherence with a set of propositions held to be directly reflective of reality. 
Therefore, the challenge to establish truth is to generate that set of propositions, and 
demonstrate that the idea is coherent with that set of propositions. 
Given a true belief, the next step in the maturation towards knowledge is a second 
generalized canon of justification, earlier presented as the assertion that an individual's true 
belief can be communicated to others. The phrase justification is used in the sense of 
JTB(+); e.g. it must assert (for a knowledge claim) or accept (for knowledge) truth external 
to the individual - hence knowledge is not established absent the presence of JTB(+) across 
individuals. This introduces two other ontological considerations, as both communication 
and another individual are postulated, but does so without conditions - the ways and means 
of communications and the form of the other individual will be subject to the particular 
philosophical foundation for a specific instantiation of canons. 
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Where truth speaks to the assertion of an individual's belief as reflective of reality 
and justification to the assertion of the ability to establish that truth external to the 
individual, a reliable method speaks to the ways of justification and a reliable context to the 
means of justification. Here, means are all of the resources (data sources, environment, 
etc.) that are used in the ways of justification. This places the method of justification in a 
venue (a scene or setting) which must be contained within a shared domain of ways and 
means between individuals for reliability to be established (via concurrence across 
individuals). 
As discussed earlier, inconsistencies with philosophical foundations can introduce 
error into the justification, method or context. Internal consistency of a knowledge claim 
with its own philosophical foundations is therefore a prerequisite to establishing 
knowledge. This is not necessarily a generalized canon in and of itself, as it is specifically 
asserted as an axiological principle, but must be borne in mind for both research and 
practice. 
From the above discussion, the set of generalized research canons for JTB(+) 
knowledge is defined as: 
• Truth: the research must establish that an individual's belief is reflective of 
reality (whether through correspondence or coherence); 
• Justification: the research must provide for establishing truth external to the 
individual; 
• Method: the research must establish reliable ways of justification; e.g. 
addressing the process or temporal validity; and 
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• Context: the research must establish reliable means of justification, addressing 
the resources used in the ways of justification. 
Table 3 provides a direct comparison of the generalized canons from Bozkurt and Sousa-
Poza (2005) and generalized JTB(+) canons. Arriving at a compatible destination from two 
different starting points is simply the absence of negation and does not validate the 
approach per se; but does provide a measure of inductive support. 
Table 3. Comparison of Generalized Categories from (Bozkurt & Sousa-Poza, 2005) 
and Generalized JTB(+) Canons 


















Establish an individual's belief as 
reflective of reality 
Establish truth external to the 
individual 
Establish shared ways of justification 
Establish shared means of 
justification 
Generalized Research Canons for Illustrative Philosophies 
Examination of perspectives in opposition provides insights on the underlying 
philosophical foundations; in this instance, the perspectives of rationalism and empiricism 
will be used as illustrative examples to frame the respective roles of knowledge and reality. 
Though similar discussions are allowable under different philosophical bases, these 
philosophies will be used to extract a point of diametric opposition that is problematic for 
complex situations (here, diametric opposition is used to indicate a point of disagreement 
between two philosophical foundations and does not obviate the potential for duality within 
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a philosophical foundation). This permits subsequent comparison with a different 
philosophical foundation as a means to reconcile diametrically opposed positions. 
For more extreme interpretations of rationalism, the applicability of generalized 
JTB(+) canons ends with truth and justification - what is innate is known and true; and 
what is derived from that in a consistent fashion is likewise known and true. The reliability 
of method is the reliability of the justification, and the reliability of context is the reliability 
of the innate; a justified true belief is knowledge and requires no additional conditions. As 
earlier stated, the notions of communication and the individual communicated to are 
governed by the foundational philosophy. Hence, the context for justification is the 
existence of innate knowledge and the method for justification is the internal consistency of 
reality (universals). 
For empiricism, the earlier canons presented in (Bozkurt & Sousa-Poza, 2005) are 
directly applicable. Truth is established from sense data, which must be acquired in a 
credible manner. Justification must establish that this true belief can be communicated to 
another individual, either by generalizing a specific case or by transferring to 
commensurate cases. Since sense data is the singular source for reality, the method for 
justification must be reliable (or dependable) so as not to introduce extraneous error. 
Finally, the context must be objective or confirmable so as to be accepted by both 
individuals. The notions of communications and individuals communicated to are 
commensurate with the primacy of sense data. 
Table 4 summarizes the internally consistent canons for these two philosophical 
foundations derived from the generalized JTB(+) canons. This makes the disparate 
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foundations explicit, but equally explicit is the relationship of each to the definition of 
JTB(+) knowledge. 























This discussion allows refinement of the relationship between methodology and 
canons discussed above. Using the concept of generalized canons completes the linkage 
between the definition of knowledge, the philosophical foundations, and methods by way 
of the instantiated set of canons (Figure 5). The importance of the definition of knowledge 
is clearly one of the most critical aspects of research, particularly into alternative 
philosophical foundations, and should be considered as one of the required elements of the 
epistemology. 
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Figure 5. Revised Relationships between Methodology, Canons and Methods 
Research Methodology 
In accordance with the axiological principle of justification, the research 
methodology builds JTB(+) knowledge using the generalized JTB(+) canons. In this 
instance, the research itself develops an internally consistent philosophical foundation for 
decision making in complex situations; hence the methodology itself evolves in concert 
with the research. This does not imply that there is no methodology; to the contrary strict 
accountability to research canons is required. Further, there is a defined starting point for 
this research (pragmatic idealism). As such, it is possible to discuss the research 
methodology that will provide this level of strict accountability within the context of the 
broad philosophical foundation of pragmatic idealism; however, this discussion must be 
tempered by the knowledge that the ultimate test of justification will be to satisfy the 
generalized JTB(+) canons as instantiated for the particular philosophical foundation. 
In this instance, the start point (pragmatic idealism) is essentially a set of 
conclusions derived from a set of premises - a rational deductive approach. Based on 
consistent application of ontological and epistemological foundations, these conclusions 
can be considered as rearranging knowledge - a form of learning where new applications 
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are found for existing knowledge. To further justify these conclusions as a true belief, 
continued use of rational deductive methods would only extend the body of premises and 
conclusions. Ultimately, the external validity must be established by the acceptance of the 
body of premises and conclusions as sufficient for consistency of the argument. 
Further, research in complex situations is confronted by an inherent limitation: 
correspondence between theory and reality, for a particular situation, does not exist - the 
situation itself is unpredictable. Once the step has been made to adopt coherence, a rational 
approach is indicated (by the need to demonstrate consistency with a body of propositions) 
as opposed to an empirical approach - or, per Simon (1973), a Logic of Scientific 
Discovery. Also, while correspondence theories of truth have their own detractors 
(particularly in the regress problem which essentially translates to a recursive coherence 
theory of truth), correspondence tends to be emphasized in traditional management and 
engineering research methods reflecting an overall tendency towards positivist empirical 
approaches. Correspondence is seen as providing a high degree of external validity for 
theory, providing an additional measure of risk mitigation in the definition of the domain of 
applicability characterizing the generalizability and/or transferability of research. 
Research methods based on coherence theory of truth must deal with the challenges 
of that stance, including the adoption of a rational approach and the establishment of 
external validity. It is not necessary to completely abandon one theory of truth for another 
- see for example, the idea of Foundherentism (Haack, 1993) - in dealing with complex 
situations it may be possible to construct a body of propositions using empirical methods 
and a correspondence theory of truth, then use that body of propositions as the basis for a 
rational method using a coherence theory of truth. In doing so, the constraints, limitations 
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and assumptions of the body of propositions are empirically rooted, but can then serve to 
define the domain of applicability for external validity via coherence. 
Analysis 
The analysis of results must conform to the instantiated canons, resulting in a 
rational deductive approach for both the construct and the analysis of the construct. The 
method includes a comparative analysis against decision-making constructs for alternative 
philosophical foundations (for example, deterministic and probabilistic decision-making 
approaches) as a part of the reliable context. The synthesis of conclusions is as critical as 
the analysis itself, and must address two distinct levels of synthesis: conclusions within the 
proposed construct and comparison across constructs. The former includes the 
comparative analysis across the elements of the proposed foundation, focusing on the 
requirement for internal consistency but also developing insights on the relationships and 
interdependencies. The latter will compare and contrast key elements of the differing 
philosophical foundations in order to gain contextual insights on the decision-making 
construct. 
Products & Contributions 
The products of this research are an internally consistent philosophical foundation 
for complex situations; a decision making construct for that foundation; instantiated 
canons, based on the generalized canons, for that foundation, and a research methodology 
for that foundation, applied to build knowledge consistent with that foundation. 
The philosophical foundation extends the assertions of pragmatic idealism to 
incorporate all of the elements of a paradigm, particularly the axiological and 
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methodological components, and demonstrates both internal consistency and applicability 
to complex situations. The decision making construct provides a viable means for 
application of the construct, and provides guidance for further research into application of 
the construct. The generalized JTB(+) canons and the instantiation of those canons for the 
philosophical foundation provide sufficient guidance to justify both internal consistency 
and assessment. 
Finally, the execution of this research exploring the area of rational research 
methodologies represents a product in and of itself. In areas where empirical 
methodologies and canons are inappropriate and potentially even dangerous (such as 
complex situations) there is a pressing need for research methodologies that can rigorously 
generate and assert knowledge claims - even though this may necessarily entail acceptance 
of significant constraints, limitations and/or assumptions. The particular instantiation of the 
research methodology for the CSP must be capable of defending knowledge claims with an 
acceptable level of rigor and a clear context. 
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS 
Introduction 
The results of the literature review, guided by the principles provided in the 
research methodology, provide a good deal of guidance both in how and how not to 
develop the desired construct, including: 
• Complexity is "the probability of making an erroneous knowledge claim about a 
situation" and is fundamentally "a construct associated with the fallibility of 
understanding" (Sousa-Poza & Correa-Martinez, 2005, section 3, para. 2). 
• Understanding is about a means-consequence relationship involving both the 
observer and reality; and therefore consideration of complexity must rest on a 
consistent foundation of ontology, epistemology and associated methodology and 
axiology. 
• These foundations must be internally consistent; and purely rational or empirical 
perspectives have limitations that prevent consistency given the characteristics of 
complexity. 
• Complexity contradicts the assertion that more knowledge results in more 
understanding; it challenges the notion that reality is comprehensible (e.g. capable 
of being understood). 
• This raises issues with bounding and framing from a systems perspective; in 
essence a systems perspective (as one of infinitely many possible perspectives) is 
seen to be a potential source of complexity as opposed to a resolver of complexity. 
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• In general, perspectives of extreme do little to aid the systems analyst or decision 
maker confronted with uncertainty but accordingly the middle ground of 
pragmatism includes elements of both extremes in philosophical perspectives. 
• Pragmatic idealism further incorporates an explicit axiological principle (the 
existence of a value premise) to reject inaction as an inevitable consequence of 
fallabalism. 
While the detailed argument draws on correspondingly more material, these ideas highlight 
the general foundation and direction for development, namely beginning with the 
philosophical foundations and deriving a basic set of principles that are consistent with 
complexity. More generally, it is desired that the argument be semantically complete, and 
therefore these principles should be tautologies. In this regard, the derivation of 
consequences or conclusions from these principles consistent with associated philosophical 
considerations may then be taken to constitute theorems as they are only asserted to be 
valid within the relevant philosophical framework (e.g. the philosophical perspective forms 
a coherent body of propositions validating the principle). The derivation of conclusions 
should therefore be sound within this semantically complete structure; essentially 
accomodating the axiological principle of internal justification. 
It should be noted that, though this discussion provides the ontology, epistemology, 
axiology and methodology in that order, in development they are nearly inseparable and 
require multiple iterations to arrive at this early level of maturity. The initial development 
was framed around ontology, which culminated in a difficulty to resolve epistemology. 
Likewise, a subsequent effort to frame the effort around epistemology led to challenges in 
ontology and a difficulty in resolving a methodology. Ultimately, all perspectives are 
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unique and can only be re-solved through a shift to another paradigm or worldview - and 
though the following discussion is necessarily linear, the end result is necessarily a holistic 
product as threads of ontology, epistemology, axiology and methodology are woven into a 
Complex Situations Paradigm. 
Ontology 
The basic ontological principle is the existence of a "mind-independent reality" 
(Rescher, 1994): 
Of. Reality is (that which exists). (Reality Principle) 
This is consistent with Sousa-Poza & Correa-Martinez (2005), which asserts that "a reality 
exists as a construct, which is both separate and part of the observer, and is beyond the 
observer's full understanding" (section 5.1), which brings an essential clarification to 
Rescher's statement as reality is framed as mind-independent and yet mind-inclusive. In 
this construction, reality (that which exists) exists and, in and of itself, is irreducible and 
cannot be subdivided or simplified - any division would establish another reality, the 
existence of which would extend reality. Here, irreducible is used in the sense of "... 
cannot be reduced to a simpler or more intelligible form; incapable of being resolved into 
elements, or of being brought under any recognized law or principle" (OED, 2008). As 
such, it speaks solely to the subject of existence, and does not prohibit or require 
reducibility in other senses (e.g. it is possible to posit the existence of something "beyond 
reality," including such individually and culturally significant aspects as the theological). 
Rescher (2000) presents the essential nature of this principle as presented earlier in the 
literature review for ontology. 
61 
The Reality Principle seems to abandon rationalism at the outset. Having already 
established the potential inconsistencies of rationalism with complexity this should not be 
disquieting in and of itself, but as it foreshadows a potential bias towards empiricism it is 
appropriate to acknowledge that bias early in the discussion. In essence, this apparent bias 
is a consequence of beginning with an ontological perspective as rationalism inherently 
begins with epistemology. Indeed, since the Reality Principle (among myriad other 
implications) essentially establishes an ontological priority over epistemology, a segue is 
necessary to introduce the notions of knowledge. This is in consonance with Rescher 
(2001) who noted that "an objective domain of impersonally real existence is not a product 
of but a precondition for empirical inquiry" (pg. 113). This is established through the 
assertion of a second principle: 
O2: Self-awareness defines a unique existence within reality. (Self-awareness 
Principle) 
With appropriate homage to long-standing discourse related to being, cognition and similar 
topics, the critical contribution of this principle (in this regard) is the introduction of a 
unique perspective embedded within the whole. This principle is necessarily tautological 
in nature and therefore does not constitute a de facto Descartian pronouncement (Cogito, 
ergo sum). Descartes spoke to existence as a consequence of cognition while the self-
awareness principle speaks to the inevitable consequence of acknowledging self - the 
delineation of other-than-self (with the acknowledged acceptance of the principle of the 
excluded middle within this rational context). This is essentially an ontological assertion 
defining the existence of an epistemology, not an epistemological assertion. From the 
Reality Principle, both self and other-than-self are contained within reality and this critical 
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disassociation of self from whole-containing-self creates the foundational duality of 
cognition - awareness of distinct existence within a reality otherwise free from such 
distinction (in this perspective). The unity subsumes all, but the duality is inescapable. For 
this discussion, self-awareness is only of a unique existence; a corollary notion of 
awareness will be developed in the epistemology section. 
From the introduction of this disassociation it is possible to infer creation and 
causality - something that was not previously in existence - so that the notions of principal 
spatial and temporal dimensions are resident within this ontology. However, this is an 
inference, not an implication - it is possible to posit that awareness precedes self 
awareness, the converse, or to assert that they are mutually generative and therefore 
equivalent in some nature. The argument to this point is not a causal argument, but a 
tautological one that seeks to define and deduce consequences of definitions - it is 
sufficient that the Self-Awareness Principle and the concomitant foundational duality of 
cogitation can be asserted to exist. The principal spatio-temporal dimensions will be 
formally introduced as the argument matures. 
A final ontological consideration also foreshadows the epistemological discussion 
by introducing limitations: 
O3: Everything cannot be contained within less than everything. (Incompleteness 
Principle) 
This is essentially a restatement of the first principle within the conditions of the second 
principle. Since reality, as that which exists, is irreducible and self awareness defines an 
existence within reality, reality in toto cannot exist within self awareness; hence the 
disassociation of self from other-than-self must constitute a limited awareness of reality. 
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Using the Kantian formulation of noumena being the "thing in itself (Kant, 1901, pg. 
248), or "Ding an sich," the noumena of other-than-self are not the noumena of self and 
cannot therefore be resident within the self; only phenomena can influence the awareness 
of other-than-self. This is a stronger argument than appealing to the self-imposed bounded 
nature of self-awareness; it explicitly acknowledges that which is excluded by any bounds 
that may be established. From a different perspective, this is the negation of the law of 
identity: that which is not-self is not self, and cannot contain "ding an sich" within self. 
Further discussions on the fundamental limits of knowledge are found in Rescher (2009b). 
An alternate perspective is to assert the primacy of awareness: 
O2*: Awareness of other-than-self defines a unique existence within reality. 
(Awareness Principle) 
This also supports the argument of necessarily limited awareness, but would permit 
awareness of self preceding awareness of other-than-self (Descartian), or awareness of 
other-than-self preceding awareness of self. This returns to the illusory nature of a 
snapshot in a dynamical consideration, reiterating notions of causality that imply a 
reduction not yet discussed. However, this perspective facilitates discussions of facets of 
awareness resident within reality prior to awareness itself - but the disassociation is still 
established from the perspective of self (e.g. self and other-than-self still remain within 
reality). 
Finally, the notion of change introduces temporal structure - that reality includes 
time and change. Ascribing these properties to reality is tantamount to asserting a positivist 
quality of something that exists within reality (either derivative of or foundational to other 
things that exist); likewise to ascribe as derivative of awareness risks asserting a 
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constructivist quality. This question is set aside for this discussion as the essential element 
for the argument is that time and change are common to awareness, whether its source is 
foundational to reality or foundational to awareness. A similar discussion holds for the 
principal spatial dimensions. Hence, the temporal-spatial characteristic asserts that: 
O4: Awareness incorporates the principal temporal and spatial dimensions. 
(Temporal-Spatial Characteristic) 
Epistemology 
The result of awareness is generically designated as a cognitive representation of 
reality (CRR, or "reality as cognitively re-presented", &cr): 
Ej: The result of awareness is a cognitive representation of reality. 
(CRR Principle) 
Cognitive is used in the sense of"... pertaining to cognition ..." where cognition is "the 
action or faculty of knowing taken in its widest sense ..." (OED, 2008). As a defined term, 
the CRR is quite literally a re-presention of reality in the cognitive domain that 
acknowledges knowing refers to something known. In this sense, cognition is the process 
(or processes) that generate the CRR. This yields the relationships indicated in Figure 6, 
where 3&cr G 13 G E. A critical distinction here is that the boundary between 3R. and & is 
defined by H given the earlier Self-Awareness Principle; alternatively if the Awareness 
Principle is accepted then the boundary is mutually generative by interactions within &. 
In either case, it is possible to delineate from the perspective of the aware or self-aware 
entity that there exists self (S) and other than self (-,9) such that (& = & u (-.&)). The 
assertion of (&cr e &) is made without additional stipulation such that & may also include 
elements other than &„; however, since the CRR is defined as that of which the entity is 
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aware, it is asserted to be wholly contained within the self-aware entity. The domain of 
awareness Ma - that portion of reality that is accessible to the self-aware entity, or in the 
case of the aware entity that portion which is mutually generative of awareness - is 
likewise asserted to wholly contain S3, without prejudice to perspectives that consider more 
detailed aspects of the CRR (note that the domain of awareness is introduced here to 
facilitate a subsequent discussion on shared domains of awareness). This caveat is relevant 
as subsequent discussions may touch upon the ideas of explicit vs. tacit knowledge, or 
conscious vs. unconscious aspects of cognition, wherein the self-aware entity may not 
explicitly acknowledge some aspect of reality that is accessible to the entity. Under this 
definition, all that which is accessible to the entity is contained within the domain of 
awareness; a further delineation of a domain of conscious awareness is a trivial extension to 
clarify such points if required. Ultimately, the CRR exists because of and reflects the 
foundational duality of cognition; it exists as part of reality because of the delimitation of a 
unique existence within reality. 
Figure 6. Relationships Between Reality, Entity and CRR 
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The definition of the CRR is intentionally conceptual and broad; the actual structure 
of the CRR delves into theory of mind (Baars, 1988, 1997) and other schools of thought 
(e.g. Churchland, 1986; Eliasmith, 2003; Kukla, 1992; Lyon, 2006) and is beyond the 
scope of this discussion. 
There are, however, some fundamental characteristics that can be discussed relating 
to generation, scope and structure. Fundamentally, the CRR is defined as reflective of 
reality and is therefore reactive to changes in reality - the first introduction of a causal 
relationship in this argument. It therefore must have some generative processes which 
modify the CRR to reflect changes in reality. As the domain of awareness is limited, the 
CRR is limited and therefore fallible. Also, the CRR is defined relative to the self-aware 
entity; as described above the domain of awareness includes the cognitive (reality includes 
self and other-than-self) there are what would be designated rational (internal to the self-
aware entity) and empirical (external to the self-aware entity) aspects to cognitive 
representations. As a limited portion of reality is accessible to awareness, it is possible to 
adopt a more precise Kantian formulation where phenomena are accessible to the domain 
of awareness and noumena are not. In this formulation, the phenomena is that which forms 
the stimulus for generating the CRR (though the CRR, since it exists, is comprised of 
noumena and thus is noumenalogically influenced as well). 
Acknowledging that the CRR is the product of some generative process does not in 
itself define the CRR. However, the generative process implies a causal relationship and 
therefore some type of resulting structure for the CRR - a structure that will be reflective of 
the generative process. This gives rise to the CRR principle: 
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E2: Cognitive representations of reality are characterized by a structure reflective 
of its generative processes. (Structure Principle) 
This principle asserts only that the CRR is generated, and consequently has a 
structure. The CRR structure is inherently a functional representation of the domain of 
awareness; since there is a causally generated structure, generative processes must extract, 
classify and organize within the CRR in some form. An illustrative example of such a 
structure (though the particular definition is not critical to the discussion at this level) can 
be considered as a process that executes fundamental levels of generating structure; namely 
the establishment of differences, similarities and relationships. This can be generally 
described as abstraction, generalization and organization: 
• Abstraction, "The act or process of separating in thought, of considering a thing 
independently of its associations; or a substance independently of its attributes; or 
an attribute or quality independently of the substance to which it belongs" (OED 
2008), speaks to separation and differences. 
• Generalization, "... general notions or propositions obtained from the observation 
and comparison of individual facts or appearances ..." (OED, 2008) speaks to 
combination and similarities. 
• Organization, "the action or process of organizing, ordering, or putting into 
systematic form; the arrangement and coordination of parts into a systematic 
whole..." (OED, 2008) speaks to structures and patterns. 
These particular designations are not critical for this discussion - in fact, even no structure 
at all defines structure by its absence. The notions of a formulation of a CRR that is 
functionally representative of the domain of awareness simply implies there are entities 
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within the CRR, and there are relationships between those entities. This is not without 
consequence, as it results in cognitive representations that have systemic characteristics, 
with systems being used in the sense of "a set or assemblage of things connected, 
associated, or interdependent, so as to form a complex unity; a whole composed of parts in 
orderly arrangement according to some scheme or plan" (OED, 2008). The notion of 
abstracting entities within the CRR from the domain of awareness, generalizing aspects 
across those entities, and instantiating some organization based on this abstraction and 
generalization results in an assemblage of things (rational and/or empirical in origin) with 
some relationship, or structure, between those things. However, the presence of systemic 
characteristics does not necessarily imply a system as the latter requires a comprehensible 
relationship between the holistic and the particular. 
The CRR is therefore broadly asserted to have an associated generative process and 
a structure, illustrated by the systemically framed set of entities, boundaries and 
relationships. In order to facilitate discussions relative to the CRR, these may be further 
assessed relative to their scope and functionality specifically comparing the generative 
process to worldview (Weltanschauung) and asserting that the structure of the CRR can be 
conceptually represented as having & perspective and resolution. 
Worldview is a richly debated notion centering on a fundamental orientation 
reflecting core beliefs, typically discussed as common to a culture or society. In this 
instance, when examining the notion of a generative process for a CRR, it is apparent that 
the functionality of that generative process encompasses the broad notion of worldview -
that is, how the CRR is generated will be guided by some process that therefore defines the 
predilections inherent to a particular self-aware entity. In particular, discussions regarding 
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ongoing research (Kovacic, 2009) explore the idea of "dimensions" of worldviews - the 
idea that a worldview could be characterized by a set of dimensions, and the interpretation 
of reality influenced by the degree of the various characteristics. Jones (1972) presents 
elements of a worldview vector, providing illustrative elements of those characteristics 
which impact the perception of reality (Figure 7). The work of Bozkurt (2009) further 
explores the idea that there is a philosophical profile for an individual which impacts the 
framing of reality. The relevance to the argument at hand is simply that there is a body of 
research discussing the characteristics of precisely such a generative process as is asserted 
for the CRR, and notions of worldview and philosophical profiles treat sufficiently similar 
ideas to frame a shared understanding of this generative process. The generative process 
can be considered to have characteristics, and the degree to which these characteristics are 




















Figure 7. Elements of an Illustrative Worldview Vector 
from (Jones, 1972, pg. 86) 
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Having discussed the generative process, the structure of the CRR can be further 
discussed. First, the degree of abstraction and generalization in the CRR is defined as 
inversely proportional to the resolution of the CRR. A high degree of abstraction and 
generalization will result in a distinctly different CRR than a low degree; the organization 
will necessarily vary accordingly. Inversely proportional is used to employ resolution in a 
sense analogous to granularity; e.g. a high degree of abstraction and generalization will 
result in a low degree of detail. Since the resolution will impact the form of organization or 
structure of the CRR, it characterizes the relationship between the CRR and the domain of 
awareness (and therefore reality). 
It should be noted that this illustrative example is helpful, but overly restrictive. 
Returning to the CRR principle, the fundamental issue is that there is a structure. 
Generalizing the example above, it is sufficient to say that the structure of the CRR has 
characteristics that will inherently differ when compared relative to some metric. The 
metric itself, as a characteristic of a generated structure, will be subject to the generative 
process; but given a structure there will likewise be characteristics, and given 
characteristics there will be degrees of those characteristics. When treated in these terms, 
the notion of resolution (or its inverse, granularity) can be held to be generally applicable to 
the CRR. 
As an illustration of this notion of resolution, consider the typical case of strategic 
planning for an enterprise. The start point is often taken to be a Strategic Vision that 
expresses a high-level approach to attain a goal. In order to be translated into action, this 
must be expressed in a fundamentally different form through the expansion via myriad 
additional details and relationships. This translation echoes a move from the holistic to the 
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particular, and examples abound where the representation of reality at the operational level 
is different from that at the strategic level. Resolution itself is clearly an essential element 
to gaining understanding in a limited and fallible CRR; it is related to the essential 
vagueness of knowledge discussed in (Rescher 2009). 
However, given that there is a granularity to the structure - a metric of scale or 
scope characteristic of the CRR - it is also necessary to acknowledge the differences 
inherent between various CRRs. A CRR can be considered to be subject to its location, 
both spatially (in accordance with the spatial aspect of the Temporal-Spatial Characteristic) 
and functionally (in accordance with its generative process or worldview). This is 
expressed via the notion of "perspective," capturing the relative functional or spatial 
orientation of the self-aware entity with respect to the domain of awareness. As an 
example, a probabilistic perspective represents one that neglects a dimension to look at 
behavior over that dimension. Given a process that may have random behaviors over time, 
a probabilistic perspective neglects time to consider the cumulative behavior as 
characterized by various statistics. This is an interesting classification as complex behaviors 
are often plotted on a continuum including deterministic to probabilistic; by this 
methodology both would represent CRRs with different perspectives. These perspectives 
are generally intended to provide understanding of the subject events - though not 
necessarily so; complexity could still be found in either perspective. 
Finally, with respect to the Temporal-Spatial Characteristic, the CRR will include 
change and time. To visit the CRR at any fixed point in time is as illusory as a photograph, 
but it is a requisite price of analysis in any dynamical arrangement. These "snapshots" of 
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CRRs provide a useful additional concept as CRRs may be considered for multiple 
temporal instantiations (e.g. the temporal association of the CRR). Examples include: 
• Descriptive: The running CRR, based on phenomena but presumed to lag reality 
• Potential: A projection of what the CRR could become 
• Historical: A prior CRR 
• Desired: A projection of what the CRR is desired to be 
In sum, the CRR is the product of a generative process (broadly aligned with worldview) 
and subject to that generative process, is characterized by a structure possessing 
characteristics including analogs to both perspective and resolution. 
The Temporal-Spatial Characteristic asserts that the CRR must change as reality 
changes. The individual, as part of reality, will change and therefore changes in the 
individual (specifically, the noumena of the individual) will change the CRR itself (since 
the CRR is wholly contained within the self-aware individual). This can be considered in 
terms of changes in the generative process for the CRR, or in changes to the structural 
characteristics of the CRR. In general terms, changes to the structural characteristics may 
be considered more amenable than changes to generative processes - it is easier to choose, 
for example, a different perspective and resolution than to change the fundamental 
parameters of worldview. The critical point is that the CRR can implicitly be influenced, 
and can be influenced by a matter of cognitive processes. In practice, these cognitive 
processes may be further subdivided, for example, into conscious and unconscious 
processes for modifying the CRR. 
These elements provide sufficient structure to assert a definition of a "situation" for 
this research; specifically that a construct to frame discussions of complexity relative to 
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reality, or a portion thereof; a self-aware individual (one or more), and the individual's 
CRR. This is analogous to Sousa-Poza and Correa-Martinez (2005), which frames the 
discussion using entity (reality or portion thereof); observer (self-aware individual), and 
solution form (CRR). The asserted equivalence of the CRR with the solution form may 
seem incongruous, but the differences can be illuminated by considering the work of 
Maturana (1988) where observation is used to capture not simply gathering data, but the 
active process of interaction across boundaries - of observer with environment, observer 
with entity and observer with solution form - capturing the essence of continuous processes 
relating learning, planning and implementation. This perspective tends to emphasize the 
Awareness Principle where the environment defines the observer as the observer defines 
the environment. Since the CRR is simply a label for that which is inherently part of this 
dynamic process, the apparent differences between the construct are a result of the snapshot 
illusion - as time progresses, the functionality and interaction of reality, the self-aware 
entity and the CRR will be equivalent to that of the entity, observer and solution form. 
Finally, experience compels recognition that multiple individuals exist within the 
domain of awareness; so multiple representations of reality may exist across individuals (to 
be addressed in a subsequent section). 
Knowledge and Understanding 
Knowledge, as used here, is defined as a justified true belief with a reliable context 
and method for justification (to account for Gettier 1963), or JTB(+). Knowledge is 
resident within awareness and further refers to the domain of awareness - the individual 
establishes (is aware of) a JTB(+) for some portion of the domain of awareness. Extending 
this to more than one individual thus requires establishing mutually intersecting domains of 
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awareness, essentially generating respective representations of reality that are sufficiently 
congruent to establish a shared context. From this definition, a classification scheme for 
levels of the CRR follows the lexicon presented earlier for the generalized JTB(+) canons: 
• Ideas: Elements of the CRR (not necessarily held to be justified or true) 
• Beliefs: Elements of the CRR held to be true 
• True Belief: A belief held to be reflective of reality. 
• JTB: The assertion that a true belief can be communicated (externally justified). 
• Knowledge Claim: Elements of the CRR held to be justified and true with a 
reliable method and context for justification within the domain of awareness 
• Knowledge: Elements of the CRR held to be justified and true with a reliable 
method and context for justification within intersections of domains of 
awareness 
As presented earlier, within this framework a knowledge claim is internally defined and 
knowledge is mutually defined. 
Recalling the earlier descriptions of understanding from (OED, 2008) and (Dewey, 
1933), the CRR construct presents understanding as a reflection of the relationships 
between entities (temporal or spatial) within the CRR - the organization of abstracted and 
generalized information constituting the means-consequence relationship. This 
organization is essentially the conceptual context for understanding, varying in degree and 
completeness (e.g. Nickerson, 1985). 
Shared Domains of Awareness 
The construct for knowledge requires mutually intersecting domains of awareness, 
essentially generating respective representations of reality that are sufficiently congruent to 
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establish a shared context. An individual's knowledge is some abstracted and generalized 
representation of reality that is held to be reflective of external reality meeting the JTB(+) 
condition. This knowledge is asserted to be a function of the degree of the structural 
characteristics and generative processes of the CRR. In order to build knowledge, there 
must exist some means to establish across individuals: an individual's CRR; the 
individual's generative processes for the CRR; the individual's structural characteristics of 
the CRR, and a reliable method and context to assert it is reflective of reality. 
Based on the principles presented earlier, there is but one reality and there is 
existence within that reality. There can be multiple self-aware individuals within that 
reality, and there can be change. From the earlier discussion, as awareness is contained 
within reality, a change in awareness is a change in reality. Hence, a change within an 
individual's awareness is a change in reality that may then be accessible to another self-
aware individual if and only if it is phenomenological in nature and accessible to their 
domain of awareness. Since the domain of awareness is only that which is accessible to 
awareness, this may also require adaptation of awareness within the domain. 
This discussion speaks to bridging across the disassociation from the perspective of 
the individual: an individual's action is change in reality sourced in the individual's 
awareness. Within reality there is no bridge required. But, with the acknowledgement of 
multiple self-aware individuals it is possible to associate a change in reality with a self-
aware entity - a phenomena carrying the characteristic of being associated with another 
unique disassociation. As a result, shared context can be defined by an individual's action: 
specifically, a change in reality, sourced in one individual's awareness, that is 
phenomenological in nature and within another individual's domain of awareness. This 
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directly implies that shared context can just happen but can be purposefully constructed and 
can therefore be located. This brings to mind the notion of action science (Argyris, 
Putnam, & Smith, 1985), and it is directly apparent that individual action of any kind has 
the potential to build shared context and facilitate mutual knowledge. 
Individual actions that are executed with the purpose of establishing across 
individuals: respective CRR's; respective generative processes for CRRs; respective 
structural characteristics of CRRs, and reliable method and context asserting they are 
reflective of reality may be broadly grouped within the general notion of communication. 
A key point here is that a phenomenon must perceived as being associated with the action 
of self-aware individual in order to establish communication - the characteristic referred to 
above conveys a distinction from actions perceived to be otherwise sourced. This line of 
reasoning returns again to Rescher (2000): "The assumption of a mind-independent reality 
is essential to the whole of our standard conceptual scheme relating to inquiry and 
communications" (pg. 97) again recalling the caveat that mind-independent is not mind-
exclusive. 
With the introduction of action and communication, this begins to approach the 
notion of the observer as "a cognitive system capable of linguistic behavior" (EA, 2008). 
Varela (1976) asserts at least three main properties characterizing an observer: "(i) capacity 
for indication: to decide boundaries, to come up with nodes, systems, to have criteria for 
stability; (ii) capacity for time: to chop a net and start a sequence, to compute through a 
process, to approximate the stability of a whole; and (iii) capacity for agreement: to 
externalize, to synchronize with other observers, to re-produce other's distinctions and 
follow corresponding time patterns" (pg. 65). 
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The distinctions asserted for the CRR and communications between individuals 
speaks to the bridge across the disassociation - the interaction of self with other-than-self 
that mutually defines awareness. In Sousa-Poza and Correa-Martinez (2005) this 
ultimately resulted in the solution form, which encapsulates the bridge across the 
disassociation. The notions of action discussed above - where phenomena originate with 
action sourced in the individual's awareness - is reflective of this train of thought; in this 
instance the bridge is seen more from the perspective of the individual. The two 
approaches are not incompatible, but provide additional perspective on how various 
principles within a paradigm can emphasize different aspects within it, ultimately 
contributing to a richer understanding of the paradigm. 
Axiology 
The area of axiology introduces a critical component for a philosophical 
foundation: to discuss the nature of being and knowing is essential, but to choose in a 
meaningful manner requires a basis for choice and therefore some foundation of value. 
The axiological component of the philosophical foundation presents the meta-foundations 
of choice and value - a selection of principles to make explicit the often implicit 
underpinnings of profound and trivial selections. Specifically, two principles are presented 
- asserting implications of a particular value and the existence of value itself - that are 
essential to the development of the objective construct. 
The review of decision theory introduced the general notion of a justification 
principle. Essentially, this introduced the notion of consistency as a principle, where 
consistency is a clear proxy for logically sound, semantically complete or various other 
expressions that imply a clear rational coherence to a basic set of principles: 
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Ai: An operation is justifiable if it is internally consistent with philosophical 
foundations. (Justification Principle) 
The tautology is present in the equivalence of the term justification and internally 
consistent following the definition presented above. This principle is a coherent extension 
of the law of non-contradiction which is itself an axiomatic statement. 
This principle was explicitly applied during the definition of the research 
methodology, which applied the principle internally in the form of constructing internally 
justified canons referenced to the definition of knowledge, but also when instantiated with 
respect to a particular philosophical foundation. However, there are direct ramifications 
when this is placed in the context of the ontological and epistemological principles above; 
in essence it holds that actions can be justified within the CRR if they are consistent with 
these foundations. This echoes the debate about the evolution of knowledge; and would for 
example deem Newtonian physics as knowledge (for earlier times) and would likewise 
deem relativistic physics as knowledge (for current times). In this instance, new 
knowledge modified old knowledge, but in some cases it may obviate that knowledge -for 
example, the notion of aether was accepted and subsequently rejected within essentially the 
same philosophical foundation (logical positivism). The differentiation serves to clarify the 
difference between a change in the CRR (e.g. additional content or a revision in perspective 
and resolution) and a Kuhnian paradigm shift in the underlying philosophical foundations. 
Having asserted the Justification Principle, it is necessary to introduce a principle 
essential to decision-making: that of value. The discussion on decision making presented 
the necessity of value, and when placed in the context of the Justification Principle the 
necessity becomes paramount. In order to make a justified decision, there must exist a 
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reason, however it be expressed - a preference or valuation that guides the choice. This 
valuation must be expressed consistent with the above ontological and epistemological 
principles. To clearly state an implicit assumption regarding the valuing entity, the 
decision in question is being made by a self-aware entity (decisions made elsewhere in 
reality, such as those by another entity, will be discussed at a later point). Since the 
valuation must express a preference, the preference must be one of things that exist and are 
therefore in the mind-independent objective reality (Reality Principle). As a result, the 
preference is, insofar as awareness is concerned, expressed wholly within the entity's 
awareness. This preference must be expressed relative to a CRR - a preference between 
projected futures, for example, is a preference between projected CRRs. This is asserted in 
the Value Principle by defining the notion of a value premise as that premise which 
establishes the ability to express preference: 
A2: A value premise establishes a preference between CRRs. (Value Principle) 
Defining a value premise does not create a value premise; however, it is an essential 
assumption that a value premise is required in order to make a meaningful decision. 
Moreover, using the rational methodology for this philosophical foundation, a value 
premise is essential to justify a decision as it establishes the premises from which 
conclusions can be drawn. 
Since the CRR is limited and fallible (by the Incompleteness Principle), the 
preference established from the value premise may also be fallible. Taking this to the 
extreme leads to the perspective of fallabalism, in which case no decision is justified. 
Sousa-Poza and Correa-Martinez (2005) reject this perspective and asserts the value 
premise can demand a decision on the part of the self-aware entity, as captured by 
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pragmatic idealism. As an example, the value premise for a self-aware entity may be 
defining in nature, to the extent of being mutually generative. As an extreme case, life 
itself - as a self-sustaining biological process - must sustain life or cease to be. A more 
commonplace example could be in an official of a government making a decision in the 
course of his or her duties - in the case of the United States government, such officials 
swear to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States of America" (U.S. 
Army, 2006, pg. 2-2). This can be considered a self- defining value premise; if a decision 
ceases to conform to this value premise then the official ceases to act as an agent of the 
government. For these cases, this type of self-defining value premise is defined as a final 
or ultimate value premise; e.g. one that would be invariant across all CRRs for justifiable 
decisions (or else it would not meet the criterion of a self-defining value premise). This 
places the ultimate value premise on a par with the generative process for the CRR - not 
necessarily a component of the generative process, but one that would impact the structure 
(perspective and resolution) of the CRR. This analogy parallels the notion of the 
generative process as worldview, and of that of a paradigm (including essential values) 
guiding not only perceptions of the world, but methods of investigation and observation. 
The ultimate value premise is therefore independent of the structure of a given 
CRR, yet similar to the arguments that assert a structure for the CRR, it can be asserted that 
the ultimate value premise will be instantiated in a particular form for a given CRR. This 
instantiates a particular representation of the value premise concomitant with the 
representation of reality (e.g. incorporating perspective, resolution and other characteristics 
of the associated structure). The particular representation of an ultimate value premise 
within a given CRR is referred to as a penultimate value premise, designating its place as 
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next to final in the establishment of value. This does not exclude the establishment of any 
number of other, transient value premises; but the notion of an ultimate value premise has a 
particular significance and its representation within a given CRR will clearly have a central 
role in decision making, as these other value premises may not have alternative 
representations in different CRRs. 
Methodology 
A methodology is "the branch of knowledge that deals with method generally or 
with the methods of a particular discipline or field of study" (OED, 2008). Methods are 
particular to a circumstance while methodologies guide the development of specific 
methods. For a decision construct, a methodology must provide guidance for methods that 
lead from data to understanding and, ultimately, action towards a value premise. Based on 
the principles provided earlier, this evolution (dynamic and interrelated) will depend on the 
CRR. 
Returning to the Justification Principle, the desired methodology will provide 
guidance for methods relating ontology to epistemology, consistent with axiology (Figure 
8). Consequently, the methodology will be composed of conclusions derived from the 
associated principles. The task at hand, then, is to determine precisely what epistemological 
and ontological considerations are to be mapped. In this instance, they must be derived 
from the considerations relating to the CRR and complex situations. As complexity has 
been stated to fundamentally deal with understanding, and understanding has been 
expressed with respect to the CRR, the epistemological components are defined related to 
understanding; it remains to determine the appropriate ontological components. If the 
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ontological and epistemological components are consistent with the associated principles, 
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Figure 8. Initial Relationship of Epistemology, 
Ontology, Methodology and Axiology 
Understanding, as presented earlier, stated in this manner involves the individual 
and CRR. By extension, it also involves the broader situation (e.g. the individual situated 
within reality); within which an individual may assert understanding or the lack thereof. 
However, given the reality principle and incompleteness principle, a distinct assumption 
can be asserted with respect to reality itself - namely, that reality may comprehensible, 
meaning "that which may be grasped" (OED, 2008) or incomprehensible, meaning "that 
cannot be grasped by the understanding; beyond the reach of intellect or research; 
unfathomable by the mind" (OED, 2008). This implicitly reflects the nature of a complex 
situation; the situation of comprehensibility (or lack thereof) exists in reality only as a 
consequence of the existence of a self-aware entity and the associated CRR. Yet, it is 
clearly an ontological condition; albeit an ontological consideration that is the result of an 
epistemic consideration. This matures the illustration of the methodology (see Figure 9) to 
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incorporate understanding as the epistemological component and comprehensibility as the 
ontological component. Each of the quadrants can be considered individually; however, it 
should be noted that in making these designations no precedence has been asserted - these 
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Figure 9. Revised Relationship of Epistemology, Ontology, 
Methodology and Axiology 
The first situation to discuss is that where the CRR asserts understanding of a 
comprehensible reality. This situation is bounded by the domain of awareness since the 
epistemic determinant does not extend past that point (which recalls the inherent fallabilism 
of the CRR, now extended to the definition of comprehensibility). With respect to 
complexity, the sources for error in knowledge claims can either rest within the CRR (if 
reality is comprehensible) or within an incomprehensible reality external (from the 
perspective of the individual) to the CRR. These are rational designations; under the earlier 
principles the CRR is established as limited and unique to the individual. Similar to the 
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precepts of fallibilism, the CRR is developed from a limited subset of reality (phenomena) 
and all the CRR of noumena is induced. Kant (1901) summarizes this as: 
Nay, further, this conception is necessary to restrain sensuous intuition within the 
bounds of phenomena, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensuous 
cognition; for things in themselves, which lie beyond its province, are called 
noumena, for the very purpose of indicating that this cognition does not extend its 
application to all that the understanding thinks. But, after all, the possibility of such 
noumena is quite incomprehensible, and beyond the sphere of phenomena, all for us 
is a mere void; that is to say, we possess an understanding whose province does 
problematically extend beyond this sphere, but we do not possess an intuition, 
indeed, not even the conception of a possible intuition, by means of which objects 
beyond the region of sensibility could be given us, and in reference to which the 
understanding might be employed assertorically (pg. 248). 
As it is not possible to prove within the CRR using inductive reasoning, the source of 
complexity cannot be proven, in general, to reside in the CRR or in reality. Such proofs are 
necessarily a posteriori (again, derivative of the inability to prove comprehensibility in 
general), and are subject to all of the individual, unique, limited and resolution aspects for 
the CRR. Consequently, even inferred causality is individual, unique, limited and has an 
associated resolution. Counterexamples to comprehensibility in reality external to the CRR 
include any non-causal event inferred in reality (such as beyond the Plank scale, or creation 
itself) and counterexamples to comprehensibility within the CRR can be found in 
complexity, paradox and duality (e.g. Goedel's theorem). In a different but related vein, 
Rescher (2009b) presents a rational argument for the infinity of facts vs. the finitude of 
truths which reiterates the limits of comprehensibility for a given CRR. 
Previous arguments established (under the tenets of the associated principles and 
derivative conclusions) that, for a given CRR, comprehension can be established a 
posteriori. This walks a fine bridge across the disassociation; for this argument 
understanding is used as the means-consequence relationship within the CRR, but here 
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there is an assertion, within a CRR, the prior comprehensibility of reality. Comprehension 
cannot be predicted within a given CRR a priori - which would leave no apparent basis for 
action. However, with the necessary assertion that asserted comprehensibility of a given 
situation will remain constant within the established resolution a. justifiable basis for action 
can be asserted: 
Mi: Within a CRR, establishing comprehension a posteriori defines a justifiable 
basis for action a priori. (Action Theorem) 
The basis for action is assumed to be movement from the descriptive CRR to a desired 
CRR; this is used in the sense of direct action towards a value premise as opposed to 
indirect action such as learning and adaptation including, for example, concepts such as 
Action Research (Argyris et al., 1985). With the assumption that establishment of 
comprehensibility can be justifiably projected forward in time, the temporal scale of 
resolution defines the appropriate transience for action and the spatial scale of resolution 
defines the appropriate scope for action. This assumption implicitly assumes status quo 
relative to that CRR, an assumption clearly valid for much of human experience, but still an 
assumption based on the stated ontological and epistemological foundations. To reiterate, 
assertions of comprehensibility a priori can be justified within the CRR but cannot be 
proven for reality. As comprehensibility implicitly refers to phenomena and noumena, 
comprehensibility can be justified inductively but not proven a priori. 
The second quadrant presents a situation where the CRR does not assert 
understanding, but the situation is comprehensible. Again, this situation is bounded by the 
domain of awareness. Since the situation is comprehensible, understanding can be 
achieved and therefore the means-consequence relationship must be attainable. This is an 
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expression of the classical empirical philosophy whereby more information can resolve the 
lack of understanding. If a CRR does not achieve understanding, a justifiable approach is 
to attain understanding through learning, through the different application of existing 
knowledge as well as the acquisition of new knowledge: 
M2: Within a CRR, lack of understanding justifies learning. (Learning Theorem) 
The third quadrant considers the situation where the CRR does not assert 
understanding and the situation is incomprehensible. Since comprehensibility is related to a 
given CRR, if reality is incomprehensible for a given CRR, then the CRR itself must adapt 
whether through generative processes or characteristics of structure such as perspective and 
resolution. Though the notion of incomprehensibility is purely a rational assertion, if the 
situation is incomprehensible, the CRR cannot reflect reality, is in error, and must adapt: 
M3: Error between understanding and comprehensibility justifies adaption of the 
CRR. (Adaptation Theorem) 
This requirement to adapt the CRR is significant; once adapted, actions must be justified 
within the adapted CRR (for example, at a different perspective and resolution). 
Essentially, all basis for action under the prior CRR are obviated - there is no assurance 
that value premises valid within the earlier CRR will be valid within the adapted CRR. 
Here, the potential of an ultimate value premise may permit the instantiation of a new 
penultimate value premise. 
The final quadrant presents the situation where the CRR asserts understanding of an 
incomprehensible situation. In this instance, the source of complexity is clear - the error 
rests with asserting a false understanding. The justifiable action in this situation is to assess 
the comprehensibility of reality - whether challenging assumptions, models, conclusions, 
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perspective, or resolution. No principle is asserted for this situation as the need to assert 
comprehensibility by establishing understanding has already occurred; it is simply in error. 
This implicitly recognizes the limited and fallible nature of the CRR. 
From the earlier discussion, it is not possible to determine the comprehensibility of 
reality a priori. Experience compels acknowledgement that comprehension can be safely 
asserted within much of the scope of human experience, but this remains an assertion based 
on the assumption of status quo and subject to the constraints of the CRR. As in the last 
situation considered, it is typical to operate on the basis of understanding - but in cases of 
complexity, it is essential to abstract not only relative to understanding but relative to the 
generation of understanding. As a result, there is a consequence of using the natural 
tendency to consider the ontological-epistemological relationship matrix as one composed 
of quadrants; this rational distinction created to facilitate understanding presents these 
distinctions as having an unwarranted clarity. To remove this illusion of clarity, each of 
these quadrants is referred to as a situation, the totality of them representing complex 
situations. With this distinction, the equivalent relevance of these fundamental situations is 
asserted as the Situations Theorem": 
M4: Absent additional information, each fundamental situation related to 
comprehensibility and understanding is equally relevant at any given time. 
(Situations Theorum) 
These four situations related to understanding and comprehensibility including an 
examination of complexity and the dominant appropriate options for the individual are 
presented in Table 5. In situations where understanding and comprehension are 
inconsistent, the appropriate option is to learn - to build knowledge and context for 
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understanding enabling the establishment of a means-consequence relationship. In any 
situation of high complexity the appropriate option is to adapt the CRR either through a 
change in resolution or adapting the parameters of abstraction, generalization and 
organization (worldview). Finally, consistent with the Justification Principle, the 
appropriate option is to act within the appropriate resolution whenever comprehensibility is 
established for that perspective, resolution and situation. 
Table 5. Matrix of Situations 
~̂~~~~~~--------__CRR asserts: 

















Per earlier principles, it is not possible for the individual to prove the currently 
applicable situation this matrix - absent additional information, each situation is equally 
relevant at any given time and appropriate options must be executed simultaneously and 
continuously. Therefore, the justifiable options for an individual at any given time are to: 
• Act when within justifiable perspective and resolution; 
• Learn when understanding is needed; 
• Adapt CRR when complexity is present, and 
• Assess assertions of comprehensibility. 
These can be summarized as assessment, action, learning and adaptation (noting the risk in 
providing equally relevant options in any order). These options will be subject to several 
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challenges in practice - the justifiable perspective and resolution for action may be 
incompatible with the individual's value premise, learning presents its own suite of 
challenges, and adapting the CRR through generative processes or structural characteristics 
may require extended effort and time. However, adapting resolution is common - it is 
typical, for example, to consider strategic, operational, and tactical levels of detail - and so 
provides an amenable option for attaining understanding consistent with comprehensibility. 
In all of these situations, these justifiable actions are those that are deemed to have 
primacy of purpose - for example, adaptation and assessment will certainly require 
learning. These justifiable actions provide a characterization of the situation and are not 
exclusive. Learning, as a justifiable action, is learning to gain understanding, and does not 
restrict learning to operations within that situation alone (which cannot be clearly 
separated). In a more general form, the above matrix would guide the individual to learn 
and adapt when paradox or conflict is seen in conclusions, and act and assess when not. 
Similarly, when complexity is likely, additional emphasis would be given to learning, 
assessment and adaptation. Recalling the potential for a penultimate value premise (the 
instantiation of the invariant ultimate value premise for a particular CRR), each of these 
justifiable actions represent an antepenultimate value premise - a clear assignation of value 
for that particular situation - that asserts value based solely on these theorems, derivative of 
the Justification Principle. This antepenultimate value premise is predicated on the 
existence of a penultimate value premise - there must exist a reason, instantiated within the 
given CRR, to act, assess, adapt and learn - as an essential consequence of the Value 
Principle. In the context of the Situations Methodology, it is also interesting to compare 
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this to the notion from Keeney (1992) where value-focused thinking leads to decision-
making opportunities. 
An immediate (and inaccurate) comparison can be made to various temporally 
oriented decision cycles, such as the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop (Boyd, 
1986, 1987). A decision cycle is fundamentally a temporal process whereas the situations 
methodology represents justifiable situations at a point in time. This, however, does frame 
a problem for reduction to practice: if all situations are equally relevant absent additional 
information, what is the guidance for the practitioner? This issue must be guided by the 
Justifications Principle, which will allow operations in any one of the situations when 
canons for truth, justification, method and context are fulfilled. In particular, the method 
must be consistent with the situations methodology. Since this is a continuous situation, 
the probability of precisely equal justification for all four situations is theoretically zero 
(though they may be approximately equal within a given resolution). In the theoretical 
case, there will always exist a preference to operate in one of the four situations; and in the 
practical case a decision to assert primacy of any one of them is justifiable. Finally, 
experience compels that there is often sufficient additional information to assert primacy of 
one of the four quadrants. The asserted primacy of a given situation may leverage, for 
example, the initial consideration of the nature of the situation at hand - if it is a situation 
where one may rationally assert comprehensibility given the likely CRR (for example, a 
well-framed optimization problem) then one would be guided to emphasize learning and 
action (the options associated with a comprehensible domain of awareness). Since it is 
necessary to gain (or at least confirm) understanding to justify action, primacy would be 
granted towards learning as the initial situation- though, per the Situations Theorem, this 
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learning should still contextually account for assessment, adaptation and action. 
Alternatively, the situation at hand may be one where there is a higher probability of an 
incomprehensible domain of awareness given the likely CRR - namely, any of the 
conditions known to give rise to complexity. In those instances, primacy of operations 
would be granted towards assessment and adaptation. 
Having therefore asserted that it will be practical to assert primacy of a quadrant 
within the situations methodology, and therefore asserted guidance for selection of a 
justifiably reliable method, the issue of a justifiably reliable context can be formally 
considered. At a minimum, the context must be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 
communication established earlier. Similar arguments to the one that determined the 
primacy of a situation can also be established to assert the relevance of the other situations. 
Disregarding the other potential situations leads to a necessarily incomplete representation, 
leading to the Contextual Corollary: 
M5: Justifiable operations within a given situation must include all other 
situations as relevant context. (Contextual Corollary) 
The Contextual Corollary is therefore a necessary condition for cognitive operations within 
a complex situation. There is no assertion of sufficiency as other factors must inherently be 
considered - for example, the acquisition of knowledge, consideration of value, etc. must 
still be present. 
The exploration of these theorems, consistent with principles of pragmatic idealism, 
illustrate the potential of a dialog within a philosophical framework - the clarity of 
expression for the Structure Principle enables the discussion of justifiable resolution for 
action, and frames the situations methodology. 
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Reconciliation with Canons 
This section instantiates the canons of research for this particular philosophical 
foundation and assessed the results with respect to the instantiated canons. The 
philosophical foundation established to this point is summarized as Pragmatic Idealism 
(Sousa-Poza & Correa-Martinez, 2005) founded on the premises of a mind-independent 
objective reality (Rescher, 2000) containing self-aware individuals with necessarily fallible 
representations of reality (the Idealism speaks to a rejection of inaction based on 
fallabalism). As such, a belief is one or more propositions (themselves constructs within 
the individual's representation of reality) that constitute a set of conclusions, from 
phenomenological sources, that generate understanding - an assertion of comprehensibility. 
Therefore, an internally consistent canon for truth is demonstration of the internally 
consistent coherence of the asserted truth with a set of conclusions through an assertion of 
comprehensibility based on phenomena. This implicitly carries the constraints and 
limitations of the individual's representation of reality - fallible, limited, and subject to the 
resolution, generation and structure of the representation of reality - but carries with it a 
specific tie to the objective reality. Given a self aware individual as a component of an 
objective reality, the interactions of that individual with reality are similarly a component 
of the objective reality and create phenomena subject to incidence on other individual's 
domains of awareness. Though this definition of a truth canon is internal to an individual's 
representation of reality, it is a definition permitting the extension of the asserted truth to 
others. 
The generalized canon of justification asserts that research must establish that truth 
external to the individual. This introduces the notion of an external representation of reality 
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(one or more), and requires the individual to assert the justification as accessible to another 
representation of reality. The elements of the representation of reality asserting truth must 
be representable through phenomenological action, consistent with the criteria for 
communication. Specifically, this must include the ability to communicate the 
philosophical foundations, the set of propositions against which the truth establishes 
coherence, and the phenomenological sources that generate those conclusions (with the 
concomitant assertion of comprehensibility). As a practical example, an individual may 
hold some data set to constitute justification for a truth - the data set represents the 
phenomenological sources, and the analysis of that data set represents a set of propositions 
against which the truth is justified. The individual then must believe the sources, data, 
analysis and resulting propositions can be established in a shared domain of awareness with 
some other individual(s). This does not guarantee that another individual or individual(s) 
will accept this truth, but a necessary condition for justification is that the individual 
asserting the JTB(+) believes this to be possible. 
The remaining two generalized canons, method and context, being the ways and 
means of justification, can be taken to represent a process and substantive perspective on 
the actual establishment of a shared domain of awareness. A shared domain of awareness 
must incorporate two or more representations of reality; by direct implication there must be 
phenomenological action sourced in the respective representations of reality that is within 
the respective domains of awareness - e.g. there must be communication involving, and 
active effort for, both. Returning to the critical point of communication, if phenomena are 
not perceived as sourced in another representation of reality (purposively or neglectfully) 
then the essential characteristic of sourcing within a self-aware individual is not present and 
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the ability to purposefully construct a shared domain does not exist. The definition of 
shared ways and means within the shared domain of awareness requires multiple 
representations of reality to participate - quite common in practice as numerous references 
on research methodology are available, providing specific ways and means to establish a 
shared representation of reality within specific philosophical foundations. 
Under the philosophical foundations in question (pragmatic idealism and associated 
derivative principles), the generalized canons of method and context are asserted to be a 
shared ways and means by which a shared domain of awareness is constructed. A reliable 
method and context must be one which is held to be justified across multiple 
representations of reality. The method and context itself becomes a JTB(+) requiring a 
method and context; ultimately this infinite regress must terminate in the philosophical 
foundations which here require acknowledgement of an (limited, fallible and unique) 
assertion of comprehensibility based on phenomenological sources. As these sources are 
held to be derived from an objective reality, they are potentially accessible to multiple 
representations of reality and therefore permit this assertion to be shared. Those elements 
of reality accessible and accessed by relevant representations of reality then constitute the 
means by which the shared domain of awareness is constructed (though this can clearly be 
constrained to those relevant to the JTB(+) assertion at hand). These elements are both 
objectively and mutually defined; hence the shared domain is immediately seen to be 
dynamic in nature - it is defined by reality and by the relevant representations of reality. 
Context for justification will necessarily be dynamic as well. The ways by which the 
shared domain of awareness is constructed are then those elements of communication 
which enable the establishment of the domain; a method ultimately speaks to enabling 
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communication via the instantiation of a body of concepts in a manner accepted by 
multiple individuals. 
To summarize the generalized JTB(+) canons as instantiated for pragmatic 
idealism: 
• The definition of the generalized canon of truth is the demonstration of the 
internally consistent coherence of the asserted truth with the conclusions 
through an assertion of comprehensibility based on phenomena. 
• The generalized canon of justification is the assertion of an ability to 
communicate foundations, propositions, conclusions, and sources which permit 
the assertion of comprehensibility for the truth at hand. 
o Foundations: the philosophical foundations and the rational derivation 
justified through a rational deductive argument; 
o Propositions: the characteristics of the domain of applicability for the 
validation; 
o Conclusions: a deductive argument that equates the behavior of the 
research domain to be consistent with the propositions, hence allowing 
the assertion of comprehensibility that the research domain will possess 
the characteristics proposed, and 
o Sources: specific components of the research domain themselves; in a 
general sense the ability to create a model with the above characteristics. 
• The generalized canon of method is the definition of those elements of 
communication which enable the establishment of a shared domain of 
awareness. 
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• The generalized canon of context is the establishment of those elements of 
reality accessible and accessed by the relevant representations of reality that 
constitute the means by which the shared domain of awareness is constructed. 
The philosophical foundation derived above can now be for each of these 
instantiated canons will be considered in turn. In essence, this serves as a final 
confirmation of internal consistency - the consideration of a philosophical foundation 
against canons instantiated for that philosophical foundation - while framing the evaluation 
against the specific definition of knowledge as justified true belief with a reliable method 
and context for justification. 
Truth is asserted through acceptance of ontological, epistemological, and 
axiological principles. Justification is asserted through internal consistency of those 
principles. The foundational principles are explicitly presented and founded on a well-
established philosophical basis. The propositions (theorems) are rationally derived from the 
principles, and conclusions and sources are justified relative to the specified domain (a 
general consideration of philosophical foundations for complex situations). 
Reliability of method is provided by adhering to accepted practices for rational 
derivations. The principles are semantically complete (e.g. expressed as tautologies) and 
the theorems are sound (e.g. derived from the principles). The notable exception is the 
introduction of an essential characteristic; however, this is such a fundamental 
characteristic that the likelihood of rejection in the shared domain is held to be trivial. 
Reliability of context is provided by basing principles and conclusions on established 
definitions common to the literature, and on explicit rational derivations where extended 
beyond the literature. 
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In total, the above canons are held to be satisfied in that a shared domain of 
awareness can be constructed via explicit rational derivations based on principles available 
in extant literature. The philosophical foundation is therefore a valid JTB(+) knowledge 
claim. 
A Complex Situations Paradigm 
A paradigm is "a philosophical and theoretical framework of a scientific school or 
discipline within which theories, laws, and generalizations and the experiments performed 
in support of them are formulated; broadly: a philosophical or theoretical framework of any 
kind" (MW, 2008). In a general sense, this research uses the establishment of 
epistemology, ontology and methodology to represent core elements of a paradigm (with 
acknowledgement that axiology must be present in a contextually dependent manner). 
Given this assertion, this philosophical foundation can be asserted to constitute a Complex 
Situations Paradigm summarized as: 
Ontology: Pragmatic 
Oi: Reality is (that which exists). (Reality Principle) 
O2: Self-awareness defines a unique existence within reality. (Self-awareness 
Principle) 
O2*: Awareness of other-than-self defines a unique existence within reality. 
(Awareness Principle) 
O3: Everything cannot be contained within less than everything. (Incompleteness 
Principle) 




Ej: The result of awareness is a cognitive representation of reality. (CRR 
Principle) 
E2: Cognitive representations of reality are characterized by a structure reflective 
of its generative processes. (Structure Principle) 
Axiology: Idealist 
Aj: An operation is justifiable if it is internally consistent with philosophical 
foundations. (Justification Principle) 
A2: A value premise establishes a preference between CRRs. (Value Principle) 
Methodology: Situational 
Mj: Within a CRR, establishing comprehension a posteriori defines a justifiable 
basis for action a priori. (Action Theorem) 
M2: Within a CRR, lack of understanding justifies learning. (Learning Theorem) 
Ms: Error between understanding and comprehensibility (complexity) justifies 
adaption of the CRR. (Adaptation Theorem) 
M4: Absent additional information, each fundamental situation related to 
comprehensibility and understanding is equally relevant at any given time. 
(Situations Theorem) 
M5: Justifiable operations within a given situation must include all other 
situations as relevant context. (Contextual Corollary) 
The assertion of Complex Situations Paradigm in no way obviates a "systems paradigm" -
generally positivist and empirical, with a suite of systems methodologies. Systems theory 
is relevant within the context of the CRR, but the Complex Situations Paradigm implicitly 
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incorporates complexity whereas for systems theory it is incorporated in general (see 
discussion in the review of the literature). Based on the principles espoused for the CRR, 
systems approaches are a method of learning and action consistent with perceptions of 
reality - but applying them to the incomprehensible or in the face of paradox is fallacious. 
A Decision-Making Construct for Complex Situations 
The Complex Situations Paradigm provides an internally consistent philosophical 
foundation for complex situations. Recalling that complexity creates a situation where 
decision making must deal not with the situation, as no basis for valuation can be justifiably 
postulated, but with the nature of the situation, the CSP itself becomes the core decision 
making construct. More specifically, the situations methodology provides a meta-
framework for deciding about decisions that is appropriate for complex situations. As has 
been briefly discussed earlier, this methodology provides guidance for the decision maker 
on where to start and how to structure specific decision-making methods. Additional 
discussion is provided on the nature of value premises, and how they can further aid in the 
meta-decision process and specific decision-making methods. 
The meta-decision process begins with the introduction into a particular situation; 
as earlier discussed it may be possible to assert an initial estimate of primacy for a 
particular set of situations based on the anticipated comprehensibility given the likely CRR. 
If the situation is anticipated to have low complexity, the methodology would guide the 
decision-making process to incorporate assessment and adaptation into learning and action 
in a contextual manner (the analogies to the "learning organization" [Senge, 1994] are clear 
and will be discussed in the final section). Given high confidence of comprehensibility for 
a given CRR, primacy would initially be assigned to learning. The methodology would 
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guide learning to focus on the perspective and resolution for the CRR that is anticipated to 
yield comprehensibility, with the antepenultimate value premise of attaining understanding 
to enable action towards the penultimate value premise. 
For situations anticipated to have high complexity, the initial development of the 
CRR would place a greater emphasis on assessment of comprehensibility as various 
perspectives and resolutions can be evaluated for the representation of reality. Certainly 
learning still occurs, but here the antepenultimate value premises are to assess 
comprehensibility and adapt the CRR to attain the ability to assert comprehensibility, 
leading to the focus on structural characteristics of the CRR (such as perspective and 
resolution) and possibly even to generative processes. In these cases, the goal would still 
be to attain the ability to assert comprehensibility given the adapted CRR. 
In the later cases, where the CRR is adapted, value premises expressed relative to 
the original CRR are no longer internally consistent, and decision-making using those 
premises is not justified via the Justification Principle. The adaptation of the CRR to attain 
an assertion of comprehensibility obviates complexity; it is rendered irrelevant as it is no 
longer within the internally consistent framework. This may require abandonment of value 
premises (goals and objectives) expressed within the original CRR. If there is an ultimate 
premise with an expression as a penultimate value premise within the original and adapted 
CRRs, it may be possible to transform the valuing principle but this is not assured. 
This condition - of relating value premises across CRRs - warrants additional 
discussion. Suppose a value premise is expressed in one CRR, and is desired to be related 
to a value premise in another CRR - perhaps at a different resolution, such that, for 
example, a value premise expressed within a comprehensible CRR at a strategic resolution 
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would be mapped to a value premise expressed within a comprehensible CRR at an 
operational resolution. This is not quite devolution or inheritance of the value premise, as 
any CRR that permits justifiable assertion of comprehensibility is equally valid as any 
other, but does represent a common circumstance and therefore the ability to frame a 
relationship within the CSP is desirable. There are two apparent observations relative to 
this relationship: the existence and scope of justification. There must exist a justifiable 
relationship between the two CRRs; in essence this creates conditions described above for 
communication where it must be possible to create a shared domain of awareness that 
encompasses generative processes, structural characteristics, methods and contexts. The 
establishment of this shared domain is essential to allow the transformation of the value 
premise for one CRR to the other, and speaks to the essential nature of a greater proportion 
of energy devoted to communication - the interactions are fundamental to a justifiable 
transformation of value premises. 
Having transformed the value premise, there is a tendency to then revert to 
operations within the respective CRRs - but based on the CSP there are cautions to this 
mode of operation. CRRs are dynamic, limited and fallible and therefore the 
comprehensibility asserted when transforming the value premise may well be transient. The 
need for assessment continues notwithstanding the single mapping of the value premise; 
indeed applying the methodology across two CRRs imposes respective requirements for 
adaptation, learning, etc. Also, operations within a CRR are still restricted to be justifiable 
within the perspective and resolution at which comprehensibility and understanding is 
asserted. If, for example, a value premise established at a strategic resolution is carefully 
transformed to a value premise at an operational resolution, operations within that 
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resolution towards this transformed value premise must still be justified within the 
operational resolution. This fundamental requirement translates to a quite practical 
guideline: uninformed micromanagement cannot be justified within the CSP. Informed 
micromanagement, however, may serve as a way to establish the shared domain between 
two resolutions. Further, the whole idea of empowerment reflects that, given a transformed 
value premise to a given CRR, justifiable operations must occur within that CRR and 
interventions based on a different CRR (one that does not share a domain of awareness) are 
not justifiable. 
Operations within each situation will employ specific methods - indeed, the entire 
purpose of a methodology is to guide the selection of methods. For the situations 
methodology, it is readily apparent that the antepenultimate value premise coupled with the 
principles and theorems of the CSP provide specific guidance on selection of methods. For 
each situation, methods should operate at the same structural characteristics (e.g. 
perspective and resolution) as the CRR. Learning methods should contribute towards 
building understanding for the CRR; and adaptation should seek different perspectives and 
resolutions from the current CRR. Assessment should determine if a posteriori assertions 
of comprehensibility are valid, and action should be causally linked (given the asserted 
understanding and assertion of comprehensibility for the CRR) to the value premise (or 
penultimate value premise if available). 
Finally, it is clear that, for complex situations, the decision-maker must have the 
flexibility to operate within all possible situations. Proscribing operations in only one of 
the situations immediately restricts the justifiability of action to those instances where 
serendipity has aligned comprehensibility and understanding. Placing an entity in a 
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complex situation where learning, adaptation and assessment are constrained is 
fundamentally inconsistent with the CSP. Though this is obvious from the standpoint of 
this argument, a bias towards action tends to predominate - if for no other reason than a 
false application of the principle of economy of force. However, application of energy 
towards a value premise, without a justifiable assertion of comprehensibility, is in itself a 
violation of this principle as the attainment of the value premise cannot be rationally 
justified. 
Summary 
This research purposed to develop a decision-making construct for complex 
situations. Noting that no complete expression of an internally consistent philosophical 
foundation for such a construct existed, the research built on the work of (Sousa-Poza & 
Correa-Martinez, 2005) to generate such a foundation, designated as a Complex Situations 
Paradigm. The philosophical foundation extends the assertions of pragmatic idealism to 
incorporate all of the elements of a paradigm, particularly the axiological and 
methodological components, and demonstrates both internal consistency and applicability 
to complex situations. In order to develop the CSP using a rational research methodology, 
the research developed generalized canons based on the JTB(+) definition of knowledge, 
and instantiated these for the CSP. The instantiation of those canons for the CSP provide 
sufficient guidance to justify internal consistency. The situations methodology for the CSP 
then directly formed the meta-construct for decision-making in complex situations. The 
decision making construct provides a viable means for application as well as guidance for 
further research into application of the construct. 
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
The assertion of a paradigm is not without risk; even the definition of a paradigm 
remains the subject of discussion in the literature. Having made such an assertion, it is 
appropriate to consider the relative significance of this paradigm (and derivative decision 
making construct) with respect to the body of literature and theory as well as the potential 
contributions to practice. In particular, since various methodologies, approaches and 
methods for operations in complex situations already exist, a putative methodology 
warrants a brief discussion with respect to an illustrative sample - though principally for 
illustration of the paradigm, this also serves to extend the shared context for 
communication that constitutes one of the generalized JTB(+) canons. This section closes 
with a discussion of potential areas for further research, focusing on the areas of validation, 
cognition, the development of methods, tools for analysis and synthesis, and considerations 
for reduction to practice. 
Significance 
Contribution to the Literature 
Sousa-Poza and Correa-Martinez (2005) provide the initial discussion (for the 
purposes of this research) of alternative philosophical foundations for complexity and 
systems, introducing the concept of a complex situation. This research furthers that 
discussion, extending the initial philosophical foundation to include epistemological, 
ontological, axiological and methodological underpinnings - a Complex Situations 
Paradigm. The difference between the solution form and the CRR has already been 
discussed, principally arising from a slight shift in precedence for ontology and 
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epistemology. As both approaches are based on the same ontological and epistemological 
foundations, the two should be reconcilable, and indeed it is noted that the CSP explicitly 
formulates several requirements from (Sousa-Poza & Correa-Martinez 2005): the 
disassociation of systemic perception, the disassociation of the concepts of analysis, design 
and transformation, and the need to address the unknown. In the first case, the CSP 
presents systemic perception as one potential form of the CRR - indeed, one that the CRR 
may present as a necessary bias of generalization, abstraction and organization - but it is 
inherently a property of the self-aware entity and exists across the disassociation bridge 
between self and other-than-self. The situations methodology likewise disassociates 
concepts of learning, adaptation, assessment and action as each is seen as operations within 
one of the complex situations that are inherently a product of the generation of the CRR. 
Finally, the basic notion of an incomprehensible reality that is in essence mutually 
generative with the CRR incorporates the core characteristics of complexity (whether they 
are expressed as emergence, context or non-ergodicity). 
Additionally, this research is aligned with a small number of works (Sousa-Poza 
and Correa-Martinez, 2005; Kovacic, 2005; Kovacic, Sousa-Poza, & Keating, 2008) that 
seek to redefine the basic foundations for regarding complexity, and further builds a 
structure that can guide operations within or research regarding complex situations. This 
represents a fundamental contribution to the literature as the discussion is extended beyond 
adapting traditional approaches to re-examining paradigms themselves. 
The contribution to theory is the internally consistent philosophical foundation for 
complex situations - the express purpose for the research - as well as the associated 
discussion of generalized JTB(+) canons. The product of the research is in itself a theory 
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built on semantically complete diverse topics related to complex situations. The discussion 
of research canons principles and defined by sound theorems. Though this theory may be 
refined, extended or rejected, it presents a necessarily complete basis to enable robust 
discussion and investigation suitable for alternative philosophical foundations and provides 
a new perspective with the potential to enable multi-disciplinary research beyond this 
particular application. 
The most readily apparent contribution to practice is the decision making construct 
itself. This represents a coherent framework for selection of methods through the 
antepenultimate value premise associated with each situation, along with constraints 
provided by the various principles and theorems of the CSP. Initial framing for asserting 
primacy of a given situation as well as the application of the Contextual Corollary provide 
broad but actionable guidance. 
Beyond these specific contributions, there is the more nebulous contribution of 
continuing the dialog regarding complexity and its fundamental relationship to reality, 
being, cognition, and value. The earliest ontologies established perspectives at the 
extremes (rationalism and empiricism) that served to illuminate a discussion away from the 
extremes - pragmatism, post-modernism, and other later philosophical perspectives. The 
CSP rests within this body of work in rejecting the extremes - and though it attempts to 
obviate certain consequences of extreme philosophical perspectives, it does so at a cost of 
obviating certain perspectives (those that engender an incomprehensible domain of 
awareness). Further, the CSP itself carries its own bias by introducing the notion of 
idealism; it is not incongruent to relate that to the bias of identity originating in the field of 
engineering - a field that seeks to "being the art of directing the great sources of power in 
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Nature for the use and convenience of man" (ICE, 2009, pg. 3). In this simple statement, 
ontology, epistemology, and axiology are all present; this may be considered an ultimate 
value premise that consequently biases the CRRs oriented to support it - including this 
research. As such, the CSP presents a dialog borne of an engineering perspective and 
matured to confront engineering problems, inclusive of engineering management problems. 
Though the dialog regarding complexity is by no means complete, the CSP provides 
another basis to extend and continue the discussion. 
Illustrative Comparisons 
Soft Systems Methodology 
Soft Systems Methodology (Checkland, 1999b) explicitly applies systems concepts 
to deal with complexity. The relationship between systems concepts and complexity has 
been noted in the review of the literature, especially in those cases where complexity is 
likely to arise. System-of-systems engineering, as an example, involves relationships 
between, essentially, CRRs of different structural characteristics and therefore faces the 
challenge of building multiple domains of shared awareness in order to assert 
comprehensibility. In a broader sense, systems approaches are typically applied in 
appropriate situations: hard systems techniques when comprehensible and understood, soft 
systems techniques when learning and adaptation is emphasized, and finally wicked 
problems such as the incomprehensible / not understood situation. 
SSM is explicitly presented as a methodology referenced to the same problem area 
of complexity. The intent for methodology is similar (noting the SSM reference to 
methodology as the logos of principles) in that it is intended to guide methods. However, 
the SSM methodology is not explicitly derived from ontological and epistemological 
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principles (in contrast to the situations methodology). SSM does refer to a systems 
paradigm, but this is not expressly defined - instead, SSM relies on a presentation of 
systems concepts in concert with the methodology. The explicit systems approach, from a 
CSP perspective, represents a bias for the structure of the CRR that may already be inherent 
(from the earlier discussion on structure of the CRR). The caution for an explicit system 
perspective remains as discussed in the review of the literature, but can now be expressed 
relative to the CSP: a comprehensible systems perspective requires a shared domain of 
awareness between two comprehensible resolutions operating at the scale of the whole and 
at the particular. Absent causal relationships between the two, conclusions at one level 
cannot be applied relative to another. 
SSM has evolved over time, moving through phases delineated by Checkland 
(1999a); namely blocks and arrows, seven stages, two streams and four main activities. In 
the latter and most recent form, the four main activities are (Checkland, 1999a): "finding 
out about a problem situation, including culturally/politically; formulating some relevant 
purposeful activity models; debating the situation, using the models, seeking from that 
debate both changes which would improve the situation and are regarded as both desirable 
and (culturally) feasible, and the accommodations between conflicting interests which will 
enable action-to-improve to be taken, and taking action in the situation to bring about 
improvement" (Section 3). 
The first activity seems to assign primacy learning; not inappropriately, but from 
the CSP that would align with the assertion of a comprehensible reality (which is consistent 
with systems concepts). In more detail, the technique of developing a rich picture is a 
physical instantiation of developing a CRR - and to the extent it incorporates both holistic 
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and particular perspectives, it will support this systemic perspective in building a shared 
domain incorporating multiple structural characteristics. The second step is more explicitly 
oriented on the CRR, but introduces the value premise as "an expression of a purposeful 
activity as a transformation process" (Checkland, 1999a, Section 4). Ideas incorporating 
multiple perspectives (e.g. CATWOE and multi-level thinking) explicitly address the 
development of a shared domain of awareness. The third step addresses the issue of 
assessment and adaption, seeking to refine the model to (in essence) gain an assertion of 
comprehensibility. The final step is a direct analogy to the action situation. 
Certainly the CSP does not currently possess the depth of discussion associated 
with a mature and refined approach such as SSM, but there is certainly a high degree of 
accommodation for SSM within the CSP. In doing so, additional considerations are 
available to the practitioner such as creating shared domains of awareness across CRRs 
with different structural characteristics. SSM is oriented on a maturing process (though 
iteration and feedback are specifically mentioned) and does not directly speak to the 
Situations Theorem or the Contextual Corollary. SSM asserts a methodology without an 
explicit expression of ontology or epistemology, though the systems paradigm is referenced 
as an underlying source. The absence of these explicit expressions creates the previously 
discussed potential for paradox in employing a systems perspective in a complex situation. 
The Learning Organization 
Senge (1999) provides a discussion of an overall management approach 
incorporating five disciplines: Systems Thinking, Personal Mastery, Mental Models, 
Shared Vision, and Team Learning. As can be noted from the subtitle ("The Art and 
Practice of the Learning Organization") the work is not expressly a product of academic 
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research, but does capture a set of management principles that had been discussed, 
assimilated and adopted within the community of practice. There is no explicit treatment 
of philosophical foundations or derivations of principles and theorems, but it does provide a 
basis of comparison against a product that evolved from a mixture of theoretical and 
practical perspectives. At the least, the subject matter of complex situations is common. 
Four of the disciplines are discussed below; the fifth (Personal Mastery) is not as directly 
relevant and is not discussed here. 
The Systems Thinking discipline introduces systems concepts, with similar 
consequences as discussed in the SSM section. Systems concepts are currently more 
ubiquitous than at the time of this writing and a good deal of the material discusses the 
basic aspects of systems thinking. From the CSP perspective, this is a valid structure for 
the CRR but, to reiterate, the systems perspective carries the burden of creating a shared 
domain of awareness between CRRs with structural characteristics accommodating the 
holistic and particular perspective. Absent the additional explicit effort towards this type of 
communication, the risk for paradox remains where one or both CRRs result in an 
incomprehensible situation. 
The Mental Models discipline is presented in a form with several characteristics of 
the CRR itself - for example, a mental model is stated to "affect what we see" (Senge, 
1999, pg. 175). This discipline stresses the adoption of new worldviews (which in this 
context could be taken to be either the CRR or the generative process for the CRR) 
reflecting the situations demanding assessment and adaptation, including referencing action 
science (Argyris et al., 1985) as a means to facilitate this adaption. Action science itself is 
a useful illustration of the antepenultimate value premise as it seeks to learn through action 
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not necessarily directed towards the particular value premise. Senge (1999) also speaks of 
"planning as learning" (pg. 187), which reflects at least an iterative (if not parallel) regard 
for operations in multiple situations. Similarly, explicit references to reflection and inquiry 
address the CSP notion of an ongoing assessment of comprehensibility. Finally, combining 
the Mental Models and Team Learning discipline speaks to establishing shared domains of 
awareness across the organization - by implication, including CRRs with multiple 
structural characteristics as different hierarchical levels are discussed in this context. 
The initial perception of the Shared Vision discipline, from a CSP perspective, is 
likely to align with the area of communication and shared domains of awareness. 
However, it contains a good deal of discussion on the notion of devolution of value 
premises. The description of a shared vision as "a force in people's hearts" (Senge, 1999, 
pg. 206) speaks to an ultimate value premise - one that is essentially self-defining for the 
individual. This is closely tied to the learning organization ("You cannot have a learning 
organization without shared vision" [Senge, 1999, pg. 209]) and is therefore a close 
reflection of the Value Principle. This discipline also accommodates the relationship 
between visions (or value premises in this context) at the shared and personal level, so there 
is a treatment of establishing the shared domain between CRRs with differing structural 
characteristics (e.g. organizational and personal). 
In summary, Senge (1999) does not voice specific ideas such as the Justification 
Principle, Value Principle, Situations Theorem and Contextual Corollary, and such would 
not be expected for this type of work. There are sufficient similarities to assert that the 
CSP accommodates the general concepts associated with The Learning Organization, even 
to the extent of aligning at least a set of the disciplines with the various CSP situations, 
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potentially enabling mapping them specifically as methods within the situational 
methodology. 
Sense-Making 
The body of work relating to sense-making bears a direct relevance to the CSP 
justifiable actions of assessment and adaptation. "Sense-Making is an approach to thinking 
about and implementing communication research and practice and the design of 
communication-based systems and activities" (Dervin, 2009, para 1). Sense-making traces 
a line of thought to Piaget's genetic epistemology (1970), which has impacted a number of 
areas of cognitive research in general but finds particular relevance with the notion of 
making sense. This is treated in a highly contextual manner; Dervin (2009) discusses an 
enactment perspective that specifically frames sense-making which "accommodates 
communications in building the shared domain" (para. 1), again expressing ideas and 
context that are accommodated within the CSP. 
The overall evolution of sense-making has gravitated towards a sense of a 
methodology as opposed to a method - (Dervin, 1998), for example, treats "knowledge as a 
verb" (pg. 36) while (Dervin, 2009) explicitly states that sense-making should be treated as 
methodology. This methodology incorporates several cognitive aspects, including 
individual characteristics that impact sense-making (perception, bias, etc.) and 
communication. The former directly accounts for the individual, limited and fallible nature 
of an individual's cognitive representation of reality; the latter directly accounts for aspects 
relating to shared domains of awareness. Dervin (1988) further states that "... sense 
making and sense unmaking is a mandate of the human condition. Humans, sense making 
assumes, live in a world of gaps: a reality that changes across time and space and is at least 
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in part 'gappy' at a given time-space; a human society filled with difference manifested in 
madness, culture, personality, inventiveness, tentativeness and capriciousness; a self that is 
sometimes centered, sometimes muddled, and always becoming. In this view, the sense 
making and sense unmaking that is knowledge is a verb, always an activity, embedded in 
time and space, moving from a history toward a horizon, made at the juncture between self 
and culture, society, organization" (pg. 36). This eloquently captures the dynamic, limited 
and fallible nature of the CRR within the CSP. Further, the sense-making methodology 
"... consists of a set of philosophical assumptions, substantive propositions, 
methodological framings, and methods" (Devin, 2009, para. 2) and therefore has some 
basis for comparison (if not alignment) across different philosophical foundations and 
methods - indeed, it is asserted as applicable to multiple resolutions such as "intrapersonal, 
interpersonal, small group, organizational, mass, national, global" and multiple 
philosophical perspectives such as "constructivist, critical, cultural, feminist, postmodern, 
communitarian" (ibid, para. 2). 
From the CSP perspective, sense-making is relatively well suited as a method for 
adaptation of the CRR to gain an assertion of comprehensibility. The treatment of sense-
making as an individual activity influenced by the individual's environment (i.e. context to 
include social interactions and communications with others) can readily accommodate 
notions of the domain of awareness and operations within a unique, individual, limited and 
fallible CRR. The multidisciplinary nature of the area also permits application of the 
Situations Principle; action learning and other techniques can be considered, as can be the 
impact of the goal of sense-making on sense-making itself (e.g. devolution of value 
premise). Assessment and adaptation are certainly related; while the combination of these 
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under the general rubric of sense-making does not detract from the asserted primacy in 
certain situations, it does enable a clear picture of the Contextual Corollary where 
assessment, adaption, learning and action enjoy a robust contextual relationship. 
Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design 
The Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design (CACD) is a cognitive 
process "to create a systemic and shared understanding of a complex operational problem 
and to design a broad approach for its resolution" (U.S. Army, 2008, pg. 4). It is based on 
a complex situation expressed in the characteristics of a wicked problem (Rittel & Webber, 
1973). The goal is to gain an appreciation of the situation as opposed to an understanding 
- within CACD, the term appreciation refers to the process of understanding a situation 
thus incorporating aspects of adaptation and learning. The appreciation emphasizes 
multiple perspectives and iterative discussions to form the commander's appreciation: 
"Discourse is the candid exchange of ideas without fear of retribution that results in a 
synthesis and a shared visualization of the operational problem. The goal of the 
commander, subordinate commanders, staff, and other stakeholders is to consider and 
synthesize many different perspectives and ideas" (U.S. Army, 2008, pg. 15). This directly 
addresses creation of a shared domain encompassing CRRs of multiple structural 
characteristics - one of the essential elements in a large organization that must inherently 
translate a value premise at one resolution (e.g. operational) to value premises at a lower 
level of resolution (e.g. tactical). 
CACD emphasizes not only development of the appreciation, but specifically 
highlights assessment and refraining. It specifically includes the need to describe the 
requirements for refraining - "the factors that would change or obviate the current 
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understanding/framing of the problem" (pg. 29). This requires a continuous assessment of 
the situation - essentially a determination of comprehensibility - that leverages parameters 
for refraining to determine when the appreciation must be refined or rebuilt. This treatment 
is sufficiently explicit for CACD to frame the following questions as a basis for learning: 
1. How to execute the planned course of action for a specific operation; 
2. Whether another course of action needs to be adopted; 
3. Whether the operational design based on the problem frame is producing 
results; 
4. Whether the problem framing needs adjusting; and 
5. Whether the learning mechanisms of the organization are tuned to the particular 
operational problem. (U.S. Army, 2008, pg. 18) 
This approach also uses the term design as opposed to engineering; in this use 
"designing focuses on learning about an unfamiliar problem and exploits that 
understanding to create a broad approach to problem solving" (pg. 13). This choice of 
emphasis tends to introduce a contextual element to learning and adaptation enabling 
justifiable action. 
CACD is based on a set of characteristics of complexity, not a rigorous definition. 
However, it is a robust set of characteristics enabling a fairly complete treatment - at the 
least arriving at the notion of the Commander's Appreciation (highly analogous to the 
CRR) incorporating multiple perspectives (at least a partial attempt to construct shared 
domains of awareness). The need for continuous assessment and adaptation is explicitly 
framed within the overall concept (by specifying triggers for re-framing), and the idea of 
design vs. engineering introduces a contextual element. However, the discussion on 
reframing does not rise to the level of emphasis indicated by the Situations Theorem and 
there is no explicit analog to the Contextual Corollary. The concept of explicitly 
examining structural characteristics of the CRR to enable assertions of comprehensibility 
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would potentially benefit both the appreciation and design phases. Overall, the mapping 
from CACD to CSP is not as clearly defined as in some of the other illustrative 
comparisons but in the same perspective the similarities in functionality remain clear. 
Summary 
This suite of illustrative comparisons provides multiple perspectives that are 
relevant to the CSP: a methodology, a method, and two approaches (with some broad 
liberties in interpretation). Though this certainly does not provide any form of rigorous 
validation (see discussion below), it does serve a purpose in demonstrating the CSP can 
provide a coherent framework to evaluate disparate approaches related to complexity. In 
each case, it is possible to recommend reasonable and feasible areas for additional 
emphasis within the particular methodology, method or approach. To the extent that it also 
provides an illustration against extant work, these comparisons also contribute to 
establishing a reliable context for justification under the instantiated generalized JTB(+) 
canons. 
Potential Future Research 
This section discusses potential areas for research, addressing several areas due to 
the necessarily broad nature of the Complex Situations Paradigm. This includes validation 
of the CSP, areas related to cognitive theory, shared domains of awareness, the selection 
and/or derivation of methods consistent with CSP principles and methodology, and a 
derivative concept designated forensic complexity. The discussion also addresses a related 
but distinct area concerning the concept and application of generalized research canons. 
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The section concludes with a discussion of potential research areas related to reduction to 
practice, including the derivative decision making construct. 
Validation 
The purpose of this research is essentially theory-generating, an overall inductive 
process that incorporated inductive selection of principles followed by a rational deductive 
generation of theorems, in composite forming the Complex Situations Paradigm. An 
immediate observation in terms of potential future research is the validation of the 
paradigm, beginning with the interpretation of what a validated paradigm actually is. In 
Kuhnian terms, a paradigm is reflective of the prevailing worldview and frames scientific 
investigation as a whole. Paradigms in this sense are generally not born whole from the 
half-shell, but are either the products of evolution or revolution within the community at 
large. The research has shown this derivation to be internally consistent and therefore 
complies with its own Justification Principle, and asserts a valid knowledge claim through 
the reliable method and context used for the justification. However, under its own 
definitions, the CSP is only a knowledge claim until it is accepted by another individual. 
The goal of attaining paradigm-hood in the Kuhnian sense is yet another order of 
magnitude (or several) removed from this level of justification. This semantic delineation 
does not obviate a search for the ways and means to broaden the method and context for 
justification. 
A major impediment to validation is the assertion of adapting the CRR, which 
obviates the initial expression of the value premises within the CRR. As an example, if one 
CRR that is structured on a substantive basis is assessed to be generating an 
incomprehensible situation, another CRR may be asserted which is structured on a process 
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basis. In this instance, the ability to conduct longitudinal or comparative studies would be 
greatly constrained. However, it may be possible to use criteria of internal consistency -
how well the extant value premise is supported - as a metric. Within these constraints and 
limitations, the CSP as a foundation for dealing with complex situations may be best suited 
for more targeted investigations of a qualitative nature - case studies, interviews and/or 
ethnographic approaches that are suited to more naturalistic/constructivist approaches. 
For more quantitative approaches, research in complex situations is confronted by a 
limitation due to the lack of correspondence between theory and reality for a particular 
situation - the situation itself is unpredictable. This may be avoided by addressing stable 
characteristics of the emergent behavior such as emergence itself or limits of possible 
behavior. Agent-based models or cellular automata illustrate patterns or limits in emergent 
behavior; alternatively, for management of complex situations the investigation of reaction 
to emergence can be examined (versus specific emergent behavior). Even in these cases, 
research methods must abandon correspondence in exchange for coherence, illustrating 
consistency with a body of propositions (for example, characteristics of emergent 
situations). 
Empirical inductive methods justify knowledge claims within rigorous bounds tied 
to reality - a correspondence theory of truth. Even for well-behaved problems, gaining a 
meaningful p-value is challenging (Cohen, 1994) - but for complex situations their 
inherently unpredictable nature of complex situations decreases the utility of the 
correspondence theory of truth. When outcomes are equiprobable, or logical complexity 
renders the next value incalculable, notions of predictive analysis are no longer relevant -
all statistics generated essentially become a statement of comprehensibility at a different 
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resolution. Considering the limits of empirical approaches, the rational approach used to 
derive these conclusions points to a rational inductive approach as better suited to the 
research question. This does not assert that empirical approaches cannot be applied (e.g. 
Maani and Maharaj, 2004) but asserts such approaches will be constrained by the inherent 
characteristics of complexity - leading, in this example, to the conclusion "that the story is 
much more convoluted" (Maani & Maharaj, 2004, pg. 46). 
A final potential contributor to validation regards the situations methodology 
specifically. As a methodology purposes to enable the development and/or selection of 
methods, the extent to which this can be accomplished using the CSP represents a 
substantive degree of validation (see section on Derivation of Methods). 
Cognitive Applications 
The Cognitive Representation of Reality introduces cognitive studies as a potential 
area for further research. Cognition is a multidisciplinary field, dealing with a subject of 
enormous complexity - the brain is estimated to have some 1013 to 1015 neuronal 
connections (Churchland, 1986). In general, cognitive models are classified as biogenic or 
anthropogenic (Lyon, 2006). Biogenic models are based in direct models of physical 
phenomena (e.g. Eliasmith, 2003; Taylor, 2004) and tend to deal with individual neurons or 
neuronal paths (Churchland, 1986). Anthropogenic models are constructed at a more 
aggregate level (e.g. Baars [1988] Global Workspace Theory) and tend to deal with gross 
characteristics that are difficult to apply to individual behaviors. Clearly, challenges exist 
for synergistic investigations of these two multidisciplinary fields. 
Though the level of complexity is daunting, Brewer and Sousa-Poza (2007) 
illustrate how ideas from cognitive studies can inform operations in complex situations. 
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Drawing from (Baars, 1988), which presents the physiological stress associated with novel 
situations, and the general cognitive desire to habituate responses to situations, Brewer and 
Sousa-Poza (2007) state: 
In this framework, observer dynamics are illustrated in tension in complex 
situations, continuously seeking to form habituated responses and modify or build 
global contexts in the face of sustained novelty - the framework seeks to build 
habituated responses, or global contexts, specifically to transfer the cognitive load 
from the low-bandwidth distribution network to high-bandwidth parallel processing 
modules or framing constructs. Sustained novelty, generated by emergence, will 
consume the distribution network; requiring sustained attention to continually seek 
understanding where the limits of understanding may have already been reached -
at the cost of increased physiological stress. In this sense, it is desirable to habituate 
novelty via developing a global context that abstracts to focus on the nature of 
novelty and not novelty itself, (pg. 57) 
This is directly applicable to the CSP and the decision making construct - focusing on the 
nature of the problem as opposed to the novelty of the problem becomes a means to reduce 
physiological stress. 
Brewer and Sousa-Poza (2007) further discuss the relationship between cognitive 
studies and complexity, concluding that: "Observer dynamics are inextricably linked to the 
evolution of a complex situation. Work in cognitive research may provide a means to 
incorporate observer dynamics into complex situations, and therefore assist in the 
understanding of the complex situation (vice [sic] the complex entity)" (pg. 59). Exploring 
general characteristics of cognition as a means to inform the concept of the CRR in 
particular (and by implication the CSP in general) is a natural extension of this research, 
and would involve a significant degree of multidisciplinary research (across two 
multidisciplinary fields). This would have the advantage of drawing on a significant extant 
body of work in the literature. 
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In addition to maturing the CSP and its application in the context of cognitive 
studies, there are within the various situations a number of additional cognitive aspects for 
further exploration. Sense-making, for example, presents an area that has matured into in-
depth explorations of the cognitive aspects for assessment and adaptation, and there are 
entire fields related to the cognitive aspects of learning. The interaction of three 
multidisciplinary fields (complexity, cognition, and sense-making) provides opportunities 
to investigate specific cognitive aspects such as contexrually informed learning, assessment 
and adaptation (as framed within the CSP). This would provide a basis to investigate 
reduction to practice for contexrually informed operations within the various complex 
situations. 
Shared Domains 
The concept of shared domains of awareness is resident in multiple fields, including 
cognition, communications, and learning (among many). The breadth of the subject is 
illustrated by the evolution of sense-making into a Sense-Making Methodology as 
described above. This does not prohibit specific investigations into areas framed by the 
CSP, including defining, building and maintaining shared domains based on the general 
concept of the CRR, particularly with respect to generative processes and structural 
characteristics. In the case of establishing knowledge, the goal would be to communicate 
sufficiently compatible structural characteristics and generative processes to build the 
shared domain - essentially with a goal of transforming a knowledge claim into 
knowledge. In the case of devolution of value premises or aggregation of knowledge, the 
task would be to communicate diverse structural characteristics to enable generation of 
multiple CRRs (at least more than one) that can assert a comprehensible relationship 
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between the diverse structural characteristics. In sum, this equates to a requirement for 
meta-discussion to enable communications. 
Since the CRR is a general concept, it should be noted that the shared domain does 
not have to exist across individuals - the case of determining a comprehensible relationship 
between an individual's current and desired CRR represents the general process of 
planning. The same issues of establishing a shared domain can be applied to this instance, 
requiring the establishment of a method and context to justify the causal relationship that 
may span CRRs of different structural characteristics. Potential for research exists in 
revisiting existing concepts from the perspective of generative and structural 
characteristics, assessing the means by which comprehensible relationships between 
diverse structural characteristics are developed, and the general areas of reliability of 
method and context with respect to the CRR. 
Finally, the idea of shared awareness - a putative quality of organizations - is seen 
from the CSP perspective to represent several intersection domains of awareness across 
multiple CRRs. The accessible reality of the organization, however it is captured through 
policy, tradition or other means, represents potentially shared method and context; it then 
remains to generate sufficiently compatible domains of awareness across individuals. This 
approach would emphasize research into the desired structural characteristics of CRRs 
within the shared domain, including the representation of organizational value premises, in 
order to facilitate concerted action. 
Derivation of Methods 
The self-identifying value premise of a methodology is guiding the selection of 
methods. In the case of the situations methodology, areas for future research include the 
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classification of extant methods as well as the generation of new methods. The former 
allows consideration (as seen in the illustrative comparisons) of how existing methods may 
be adapted to operate under the CSP. For comprehensible situations, there are numerous 
existing methods that either frame learning (e.g. Action Science) or frame learning to gain 
understanding and transition to action (e.g. Hard Systems Engineering, Risk Analysis, 
Decision Theory, and analytical techniques in general). The learning organization 
approach also tends to emphasize the comprehensible. Methods devoted specifically 
towards action include such well-known approaches as Project Management, Configuration 
Control, and Process Control; for highly comprehensible and well understood situations 
this would include Lean Six Sigma or similar approaches. As the situations transition to 
high complexity, methods such as Soft Systems Methodology come into play - but it 
should be noted that this is somewhat sequential in practice, and SSM will transition from 
learn, to assess, to adapt, and possibly return before transitioning to action. This can be 
seen as a necessary shift of primacy given the situation, but can also be a by-product of an 
overly simplistic treatment of a methodology applied as a sequential method - Checkland 
(1999a) cautions against treating the methodology as a method. The technique of 
developing a rich picture is not restricted to SSM, and can be seen as either a learning 
approach or an adaptation approach (depending on the intent for the development of same). 
Sense-making, as described earlier, may be particularly well suited as a method for 
adaptation and assessment - but it represents a methodology in and of itself, implying that 
there may be a finer level of detail in leveraging this approach. Still, the general concepts 
of communications to enable individual assessment and adaptation are appropriate in any 
one of the situations where either there is a lack of understanding or of comprehensibility. 
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Finally, there are emerging environments such as the Complex Adaptive Situations 
Environment at Old Dominion University (Sousa-Poza, 2009) which are expressly founded 
on the philosophical foundations of Pragmatic Idealism and therefore have a high degree of 
applicability across all situations. Figure 10 presents a summary of these methods mapped 
to the situations methodology, illustrating the general area of applicability for each. Hard 
systems engineering is represented uniquely by an arrow as it represents a well-structured 
approach for dealing with extremely complicated problems in a manner that allows 
specification and attainment of well-defined requirements. However, in those cases where 
requirements are ill-defined, or the problems become complex, hard systems engineering 
can be severely challenged (as discussed in the review of the literature). 
Epistemology 
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Figure 10. Illustration of Methods Within the Situations Methodology 
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The generation of methods for the various situations, based directly on the 
principles, theorems and corollaries presented by the CSP, is of particular interest as an 
area for further research - both since new methods are welcomed in this highly challenging 
areas, and because this serves as an additional measure of validation for the CSP as a whole 
and the situations methodology in specific. Though admittedly broad, there is a substantive 
level of guidance provided for methods, beginning with the antepenultimate value premise 
associated with each situation. The Justifications Principle provides guidance as to 
operations with respect to the generative processes and structural characteristics of the 
CRR; creating methods based on this concept as opposed to adapted to it may hold some 
promise. The Situations Principle provides guidance for transition between methods, and 
the Contextual Corollary provides additional guidance for structuring methods with respect 
to other situations - for example, how learning methods can also accommodate assessment 
of comprehensibility, how the assessment may potentially aid adapting structural 
characteristics of the CRR, or if there are there determinable bounds for justification for 
action (analogous to the criteria for refraining in CACD). Preliminary research is 
underway regarding an approach called Reverse Decision Making (RDM), which is based 
on the CSP (Kovacic, 2009). The initial research for RDM focuses on a process 
perspective that instantiates substantive perspectives in specific situations as warranted. 
Forensic Complexity 
As complexity cannot be predicted, recreating complex situations does not 
substantively contribute to attaining a value premise. It is possible, as illustrated by the 
CSP itself, to investigate characteristics of complexity in order to consider justifiable 
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operations within complex situations. Toward these ends, the concept of forensic 
complexity (Gheorghe, 2008) has been postulated as a potential future area of study, 
essentially studying past complex situations to assess the ways and means by which 
antepenultimate value premises were attained (or not attained, as the case may be). More 
precisely, a statistical analogy may be appropriate as forensic complexity would possess 
descriptive and inferential aspects. Descriptive forensic complexity addresses, for 
example, the generative processes and structural characteristics of comprehensible CRRs; 
mechanisms for assessment of comprehensibility; adaptation of CRRs, including the 
transformation or obviation of value premises; and approaches for embedding context for 
operations within the various situations. These may also include methods for the formation 
of comprehensible CRRs that were not necessarily understood at the time, as a means to 
inform or refine learning (or the transition from assessment/adaptation to learning). 
Inferential forensic complexity would then address the application of such meta-constructs 
to complex situations to aid in assessment and adaptation. This explicitly does not violate 
the Incompleteness Principle; such inferential statements are confined to cognitive 
operations in complex situations. 
Generalized JTB(+) Canons 
As noted in Brewer and Sousa-Poza (2009) there are several areas meriting 
additional research related to the generalized canons themselves. These include further 
refinement of the definition of JTB(+) knowledge and the development of generalized 
canons for other definitions of knowledge. 
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Application to Practice 
The Structural Theorem presents opportunities to further explore complex systems 
within the CSP. As previously mentioned, resolution is commonly used to differentiate 
strategic, operational and tactical levels of resolution; issues of command and control 
follow by extension. Transitioning guidance or information across levels requires a means 
of bridging across disparate resolutions. This will require establishing causal linkage 
between levels of resolution - which will necessarily be inferred as this will involve 
noumena not accessible to the CRR at either level of resolution. This calls for further 
research into transitions across levels of resolution, particularly in the area of building a 
shared domain of awareness for value premises originating in CRRs of different structural 
characteristics. 
The CRR as presented here is an abstract construct that raises issues of some form 
of physiological equivalence to establish a realized context for further investigation. As an 
example, the notion of adapting the CRR embodies diverse concepts such worldview, 
perspective, and resolution which may bear further exploration in a realized context. The 
principles provided here also provide a comparison - complementary and supplementary -
with the principles of the observer set forth by Kovacic, Sousa-Poza, & Keating (2007) 
regarding the Type III Theory of the Observer. Additional aspects should explore the 
relative primacy of justifiable actions within the various situations, as well as incorporating 
other situations as context. 
The Complex Situations Paradigm provides a basis for further dialog and 
investigation. Though even the definition of paradigm itself is a rich subject for debate, the 
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comparison of a systems paradigm and a situations paradigm holds the potential for 
illuminating perspectives in both theory and practice. The methodology of equally relevant 
situations challenges the dominant priority in practice, which is typically one of acting, 
learning when challenged in action, and adapting perspective as a last resort. Applying 
these actions continuously and simultaneously implies moving beyond inner / outer loop 
learning to a construct of action, assessment, learning and adapting, in concert, exploiting 
the balance of situations as context for cognitive operations in any given situation. 
Summary 
This research identified a gap in literature, theory and practice and posited a 
research subject that ultimately contributed to closing the gap in all three areas. System 
engineers, managers and other professionals continue to deal with complex situations that 
are sometimes of critical importance (Richardson, 1994) by extending and adopting 
existing approaches. From the review and analysis of the literature, the limitations and 
shortcomings of applying traditional system engineering or management practices to 
complex situations are apparent. These are traceable to the uncertainty inherently 
associated with complexity, indicating the need for a construct such as the CSP to enable or 
frame decision making in complex situations. This required development of a suitable, 
internally consistent philosophical foundation, which in turn dictated a rational research 
methodology. This approach is illustrated in the development of generalized JTB(+) 
canons to guide the research, effectively tying the foundations and the research back to a 
definition of knowledge. In sum, this research identified a knowledge gap, and 
demonstrated a contribution to close that gap. It requires accepting knowledge claims 
129 
within the philosophical foundation of the Complex Situations Paradigm, based on a 
research methodology that is consistent with the constraints imposed by the subject area. 
With some latitude in perspective, this research could be described as creating an 
anticipatory paradigm - though, since a paradigm is supposed to reflect the prevailing 
mode of thought for scientific inquiry, it is not necessarily apparent that one may create a 
paradigm a priori. However, it is typically the unresolved problem that initiates a 
paradigm shift - certainly as opposed to solutions formulated within a different paradigm 
during the evolutionary phase of development. In both the subject matter area and the 
research methodology, this research holds potential to further dialog and discussion in the 
treatment of complex challenges. 
The breadth of Complex Situations Paradigm itself holds the capacity for larger 
applications. If its utility shows promise, the dialog regarding the general class of areas 
dealing with the tension between certainty and uncertainty, constructivist and positivist, 
and other dialectics originating in philosophical differences may be enriched by this 
perspective. Engineering management, originally born of necessity, represents a field that 
must inherently embrace both analysis and synthesis, both as technology grows to attain 
levels of complexity previously not encountered and as the ability to separate technology 
from social aspects (and all the associated potential for complex behaviors) becomes 
increasingly difficult. As this field matures to a discipline (a point that can be richly 
debated), it is appropriate to challenge the underlying philosophical foundations - and the 
Complex Situations Paradigm may contribute to that dialog. Systems engineering, "hard" 
and "soft," can be enriched by considering the role of the observer, the generative and 
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structural characteristics of how reality is represented, and the basic notions of 
comprehensibility as a function of the observer. 
The devotion of such effort to matters debated over millennia may seem far 
removed from the "fierce urgency of now."' Philosophical foundations are oft regarded as 
interesting diversions, overwhelmed by practical and pressing details. Yet, the earlier 
definition of engineering itself - "being the art of directing the great sources of power in 
Nature for the use and convenience of man" (ICE, 2009, pg. 3) - includes methodology 
(directing), ontology (Nature), axiology (use and convenience), and epistemology (man), 
so it would seem this is a topic area worthy of its due for engineers and philosophers alike. 
James (1995) provides a perspective that is appropriate for closing the discussion: 
There are some people - and I am one of them - who think that the most practical 
and important thing about a man is still his view of the universe. We think that for 
a landlady considering a lodger, it is important to know his income, but still more 
important to know his philosophy. We think that for a general about to fight an 
enemy, it is important to know the enemy's numbers, but still more important to 
know the enemy's philosophic. We think the question is not whether the theory of 
the cosmos affects matters, but whether, in the long run, anything else affects them. 
(pg. 1) 
1 From Dr. Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream" speech, 28 August 1963. 
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